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Time of Trouble:

THE 23RD CONGRESS

ISAAC DEUTSCHER

SPAIN: A REPORT

N. L. TERUEL

The Tricontinental

JOSÉ VAZEILLES

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EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS: USA: 116 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.
Telephone: CHelsea 2-6494.
Europe: Frances Kelly, 9 King Edward Mansions, 629 Fulham Road, London, S.W.6., Telephone: Renown 8824.
Latin America: Editorial Perspectivas, Av. Roque Saenz Peña 760, (of. 531) Buenos Aires, Argentina
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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Readers of this column may remember that last month we announced the launching of the MR Press project—a series of reprints of "Socialist Classics." Details on the first two titles and their prepublication and list prices will be found in the advertisement on page 64 of this issue. We hope many MR readers will want to add the books in this series to their libraries, and that they will also call the attention of librarians in their area to the renewed availability of these titles. Many new libraries are being established at present and many old ones expanded: large amounts of money are being spent. It is up to socialists to see that a fair share of it goes for the purchase of worthwhile socialist books.

We also call your attention to the advertisement for William Hinton's *Fanshen* on the back cover. We recognize that the list price of $12.50 for this book is high (though not out of line with customary pricing of books of comparable size and cost). At the same time we point out again, as we have on many occasions before, that our own readers do not have to pay these high prices. If you join MR Associates, you can get *Fanshen* for $6.25, a real bargain. And even if you are not an Associate, you can take advantage of the prepublication price of $9.00. We are convinced that *Fanshen* will take its place as a very important source of first-hand information on the Chinese Revolution. We want you to have it.

(*continued on inside back cover*)

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TIME OF TROUBLE: THE TWENTY-THIRD CONGRESS

BY ISAAC DEUTSCHER

We are privileged to publish in this space the text of an interview which our London representative, MR Press Associate Editor Frances Kelly, had with Isaac Deutscher on April 20th, on the subject of the recent Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mr. Deutscher, the well-known authority on Soviet history and society, is the author of biographies of Stalin and Trotsky.—*The Editors*

What was the characteristic feature of the Twenty-third Congress?

Let me first outline in broad terms the background to the Twenty-third Congress. The task of the Congress was to draw a formal balance of the five years that had passed since the Twenty-second Congress in 1961. In fact a balance had to be drawn of a longer period—of the decade since the Twentieth Congress, the years when Khrushchev was in power. At the Congress the ruling group put a tombstone, as it were, on Khrushchev's political grave without mentioning his name even once. He was blamed for the impasse in which Soviet farming finds itself, being unable to provide a secure basis for a rising standard of living. He was blamed for the consequent slowing down of the tempo of industrial development. In fact the Soviet government has had to cope here with a difficult legacy. The inability of Soviet agriculture to get out of its stagnant condition has indeed affected the whole economic pattern and has weakened the momentum which had carried industry forward over so many decades. In part these difficulties resulted from Khrushchev's uncoordinated experiments or, as they put it at the Congress, from his "subjectivist" approach to economic

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issues. In part, however, the difficulties arise from objective circumstances and are connected with the transition of the Soviet economy from "primitive socialist accumulation" to a more normal mode of accumulation. The ever heavier burden of armament is, of course, also weighing on the economy and retarding its progress. Another adverse factor is the inability of the Soviet ruling group to arrange a satisfactory international division of labor within the non-capitalist world; a division of labor that would enable all "socialist" countries—all members of Comecon and China—to advance more rapidly.

The critical condition of the economy is having its political effects. There has been widespread discontent with the sluggishness of farming, with bureaucratic rigidity and chaos in some sectors of industry, and above all with the lack of anything resembling workers' control or workers' participation in management. All this results in the persistent gulf between rulers and ruled, for the workers and the lower grades of the intelligentsia feel that they are deprived of their rights and that all that matters in social and political life is settled in an arbitrary way by the people at the top. This is, in my view, a decisive factor, aggravating the objective economic difficulties.

It is also obvious that the ten years of Khrushchevite de-Stalinization have led to a moral and political impasse. The de-Stalinization was half-hearted, inconsistent, incoherent, and therefore unsatisfactory. It did not explain to the country the "great mystery" of the Stalin era and of the "personality cult." All too often it made of Stalin the scapegoat for all the evils of an epoch, for all the sufferings of the Soviet people, for the tremendous price they paid for economic progress and victory in war. Stalin was to be the scapegoat of his bureaucracy, whose honor and whose privileges were to be left intact. This could not and cannot work in the long run. Khrushchevism did not reject the big Stalinist lie in favor of the truth; it sought to replace it by a set of half-truths only. This led inevitably to much cynicism, hate, and dangerous disillusionment, without offering the young intelligentsia and workers any positive idea or any positive political method capable of filling the vacuum left by the destruction of the idols and taboos. Cynicism, when

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it is widespread and acute, indicates an ideological void and is, as a rule, reactionary. The effects of de-Stalinization which could and should have been wholly progressive have indeed become partly reactionary, because the Party and the people have not so far been offered a real alternative to Stalinism. The great traditions of Russian Marxism and of Leninism have not really been brought back to life. The "leaders" had left the young and even the middle generations floundering in an ideological chaos. The result is a widespread disgust with politics and a desire to "forget all about it," another characteristic feature of the mood provoked by a half-hearted semi-de-Stalinization. In this respect the affair of Sinyavsky and Daniel was symptomatic. Writers of their kind reflect the disgust with politics of which I am speaking; but as an old Russian saying has it, "it is no use breaking the mirror when it shows the face to be ugly." Perhaps even more disturbing may be the case of Tarsis, a very mediocre writer who, allowed to leave the Soviet Union, has startled even his friends and protectors abroad by his savagely and absurdly reactionary ravings. Unfortunately, even a Tarsis may be representative of certain moods in Soviet society, although one hopes that he really belonged to a lunatic fringe there.

Viewing these complicated, open and hidden cross-currents, it is difficult to know what is the balance between the progressive, socialist forces in Soviet society and the reactionary ones. It is difficult to gauge the strengths of the various trends because there is no open debate or controversy; and so the various attitudes have no chance of crystallization and confrontation.

The Sino-Soviet conflict too has affected the domestic political climate. Since the anti-Maoist controversy has been conducted in terms of a campaign against the doctrinaire Left or ultra-Left, it has encouraged nationalistic-conservative and right-wing elements who are banking on an aggravation of the conflict with China and hoping that, as the antagonism develops, the Soviet Union will shift decisively to the Right and come to terms, politically but also ideologically, with the Western World, especially with the United States. You may remember that in the twenties and thirties there was much talk among anti-

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Stalinists about a "Thermidorian" reaction in the USSR. These historical analogies are always risky; yet at times it seems that something like a Thermidorian fog is spreading over the Soviet Union. I think that the Maoists are wrong when they speak of a tendency to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union; but a new groundswell of a peculiar kind of reaction and conservatism is unmistakable.

How did the Twenty-third Congress react to all these trends and pressures in the background?

First of all, the Congress scrapped many, if not most, of Khrushchev's administrative and economic reforms; or, rather, it approved Brezhnev's and Kosygin's action in scrapping those reforms in the course of the last year or so. The Congress has also marked a severe setback to the process of de-Stalinization.

But let us go through the record of the Congress in the various sectors; and let us first see what it has brought in the field of economics. The Congress has adopted directives for a new Five Year Plan covering the years from 1966 to 1970. That the Plan marks a definite retrenchment becomes clear when one compares it with the Plan adopted at the preceding Congress in 1961. (Incidentally, a Soviet citizen who would now wish to buy a copy of the Twenty Year Plan and of the Party Program, adopted at the Twenty-second Congress, would not easily find these in the bookshops of Moscow or Leningrad. The Program, still hailed so recently as "epoch making" and compared with the *Communist Manifesto*, has been treated since Khrushchev's downfall almost as a piece of subversive literature.)

According to Khrushchev's Plan, the Soviet Union was to "surpass the United States of America in industrial output per capita of population" around 1970. Brezhnev and Kosygin have tacitly acknowledged that this grand scheme is unrealistic and that, unless the United States is hit by a catastrophic slump in the next few years, the Soviet Union will still lag behind at the end of this decade. This is not to say that the Soviet economy as a whole, especially its industrial sector, is stagnant;

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certainly not. The new Plan, although less sweeping than Khrushchev's vision of the future, still provides for a very fast rate of growth. The volume of industrial production is to expand by about 50 percent in the next five years; net national income is to grow by 40 percent, while real per capita incomes of workers and farmers are to grow by 30 percent. The USSR, having in recent years doubled its output, for instance, of electricity, is now planning to raise that output from about 500 billion kilowatts to 850 billion; Khrushchev's Plan provided for an output nearer the 1,000 billion mark, which would still be below the current American level. The Soviet oil industry, rather small until recently, is now yielding about 250 million tons, and is planning an output of 350 million for 1970, only a little below current American production. The coal industry has been producing nearly 50 percent more coal than the American for quite a few years now. In steel an increase is planned from the present 90 million tons to about 125 million, which is about the American peak output so far, but 20 million tons below Khrushchev's target. Another indication of the tempo of development is supply of cement: this is to be increased from the 73 million tons produced in 1965, which is 20 percent or so above the American level, to over 100 million tons in 1970; Khrushchev's target was 122 million tons. In chemicals and synthetic fibers the reductions from Khrushchev's targets are more drastic; in some cases they amount to 50 percent.

What about consumer goods?

The overall output of consumer industries is to be increased by about 45 percent, while the supply of producer goods is to grow by over 50 percent. However, Kosygin and Brezhnev have avoided going to the extremes of the old anti-consumptionist policy. The discrepancy between producer and consumer goods, though it remains, is less than it used to be. But again in farming, the planned rate of growth—25 percent in five years—is so slow that in relation to the needs of the growing population the prospect is one of virtual stagnation. In grain the hope is for a 30 percent increase from the rather low

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average harvests of recent years. This would amount to a total yield of between 170 and 180 million tons of grain by 1970; Khrushchev, hoping for a 75 percent rise from the same statistical base, expected a grain crop of 230 million tons.

And defense expenditures?

The proportions of the Plan are in part determined by rising defense expenditure. No reliable figures about this are available, but both Brezhnev and Kosygin have repeatedly and emphatically stated that growing military expenditure has affected the whole economy. The situation produced by the war in Vietnam is to some extent similar to that which arose during the Korean war, although the Soviet Union is now much wealthier and can more easily take the consequences in its stride. However, the mass of consumers cannot hope for as rapid an improvement of their lot as they might have got in other circumstances.

The international tension and the uncertainties of the war in Vietnam are inducing the Soviet leaders to play for safety and to call a halt to risky economic reform; at the Congress there was not much talk about the previously advertised ideas for innovations and about the new scope that was to be given to the "profit motive." Part of the reticence was also undoubtedly due to a fear that these changes, especially a drastic emphasis on the independent operation of profit-oriented industrial concerns, might disorganize the planned economy. These difficulties are real enough, although it should always have been clear to Marxists that a planned economy cannot isolate itself from the market forces and that these have always been at work in the Soviet economy, even though they were ignored during the Stalin era. It is also evident that the effective balancing of market forces and planning is one of the most difficult tasks any post-capitalist government has to cope with, especially in a country with a backward and far-from-socialist agriculture. The balancing has to be done against the forces of the world market as well as against those of the domestic market. In this respect Yugoslavia is undergoing a test of inter-

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national significance. The Yugoslavs have now practically abolished their monopoly of foreign trade, and allow their industrial concerns to trade more or less freely with foreign capitalist countries. This is a dangerous experiment—something like it was attempted in the Soviet Union in 1922, but was firmly resisted by Lenin who considered the monopoly of foreign trade a *sine qua non* of socialist planning in an underdeveloped country exposed to strong capitalist pressures. The Yugoslavs have still to provide evidence that Lenin's view is now outdated. If the Russians encourage their concerns to "trade freely" on the home market they may also run up against the problem of their independent trading in foreign markets.

What has been the Congress's contribution to the political development of the USSR?

As far as one can judge from here, the Congress had to reckon with a certain political nervosity that made itself felt in the preceding weeks and months. Rumors of an impending "reassessment" or even rehabilitation of Stalin and a halt to de-Stalinization had caused alarm among the intelligentsia and in various Party circles. Eminent nuclear physicists, scientists, writers, and party veterans protested; and a group of "old Bolsheviks," victims of the Stalinist terror, called for a demonstration in Red Square, a demonstration which was averted by the timely concentration of a great mass of police on the spot. These protests had their effect: no open "reassessment" of Stalinism was attempted. But the Congress did reveal a swing from reform and de-Stalinization to a more rigid authoritarian policy which, for lack of a better term, may be described as crypto- or neo-Stalinist. "We want no more rocking of the boat. We have had enough of that," the Congress said in effect to the "liberals," the de-Stalinizers, and the advocates of further reforms. Stability, discipline, and caution were the watchwords. Such, however, was the fear of taking political risks that the authoritarians did not dare to boast of their success. (They merely protested against "wholesale denigration of our heroic past" by novelists and memoirists, and called for stricter Party

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supervision over the writing of history and over literature and the arts.) Evidently, no one in his senses who aspires to play a role in Soviet political life, can afford to come out openly as defender of Stalin and his record. This, incidentally, accounts also for the fact that the Congress did not think it proper to rehabilitate Molotov and Kaganovich, although their associate, the old Marshal Voroshilov, was brought back into the Central Committee.

The authoritarian trend in Party affairs has thus shown itself not so much in any open acts but in furtive maneuvers and symbolic gestures. The Party's supreme authority, the Presidium, has been renamed the Politbureau, as it was called from 1917 until 1952. Brezhnev is no longer First Secretary but General Secretary, as Stalin was. The leaders of the three most powerful organizations, those of Moscow, Leningrad, and the Ukraine, came forward with the demand for the restitution of the old title, recalling that it was Lenin who had introduced it in 1922. But as the Politbureau and the office of the General Secretary acquired their awe-inspiring aura only during the Stalin era, there was an undertone of Stalinist nostalgia in the call for the restitution of those offices. The leaders of Moscow, Leningrad, and the Ukraine called in fact for "strong leadership," for a strong arm at the helm. They were acclaiming the new General Secretary who is to lead the Party out of the present Time of Trouble.

The Congress further decided to abolish the restrictions, which, on Khrushchev's initiative, the Twenty-second Congress had placed on the re-election of members to various committees, but especially to the Central Committee, for second, third, or fourth terms. This reflects the hierarchy's fear that changes in its personnel and the bringing in of too much fresh blood might result in too radical an alteration in the character and identity of the entire ruling group. Invoking a "Leninist" precedent, the Congress decided that national Party Conferences will be held in the intervals between the Congresses. (The difference consists in this, that delegates to Congresses are, in principle, elected by the rank and file, while participants in the Conferences are all appointed from above.) The Conferences were, even in the

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Twenties and Thirties, the bureaucracy's own conventicles, immune from the impact of any outside influences; and this is likely to be their role once again. The holding of Conferences may also be a good excuse for stretching the intervals between the Congresses and avoiding convening a Congress in a critical situation. These measures, and the general tightening of disciplinary rules, show Brezhnev and his adherents to be anxious to strengthen the Party's structure and its moral authority, so badly shaken by the many upsets of the post-Stalin era. In this context the circumstance that Mikoyan was not re-elected to the Politbureau on which—whatever its name—he had served for 40 years, was of some significance, although his non-election was justified on grounds of his old age and ill health. Mikoyan was the brain behind Khrushchev in the hey-day of de-Stalinization. He left in silence; the Congress did not even thank him for his 40 years' service, and his exit gladdened the crypto-Stalinists.

I think, however, that the shift towards a more authoritarian policy has not been due only to the efforts of people who may be described as crypto-Stalinists. It seems that many others who would normally be opposed to any rehabilitation of Stalin, or to any return to his practices, felt that this was "not the time to rock the boat." Party members whose political thinking is in the revolutionary tradition are also alarmed by the cynicism, disgust with politics, and other reactionary moods spreading in the intelligentsia and beyond. The strength of the crypto-Stalinists consists in the backing they can apparently get from such elements, who are not tainted with Stalinism but feel that something should be done to stop the ideological disarray. Those afraid that the party might be shifting too far "to the Right" are joining hands with crypto-Stalinists to avert such a development.

Can the ideological disarray be brought under control by these methods?

It seems to me that the Congress has embarked on the wrong road. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether the ideological disarray can be brought under control by the methods

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adopted. The answer to the spread of cynicism and reactionary moods does not lie in the restitution of old and largely discredited titles; nor does it lie in the attempts to stop the de-Stalinization and to tighten the reins of official control. The trouble with Khrushchev's policy was not that it carried de-Stalinization too far but that it did not carry it far enough. What the Soviet Union needs now is not Khrushchevite half-measures and half-truths but the full and critical survey of the record of the Stalin era, for without mastering that record the Soviet Union cannot move ahead from its present ideological impasse. The demolition of the idols and myths of Stalinism cannot be undone. Any attempt to undo it will only intensify the ferments and will cause a further deterioration in national morale. It is no use now—it is too late—to try and hide the truth about the Stalin era; it has to be brought up into broad daylight sooner or later; and the later this is done the more painful and convulsive is going to be the eventual *dénouement.*

All this should be seen against a growing conflict of generations. We Marxists avoid, as a rule, speaking about such phenomena and concentrate our attention on conflicts of classes and antagonisms of social groups. Within the framework of any class structure, however, and even within the same class, conflicts of generations do occur, and in the Soviet Union the clash is very dramatic indeed: within the bureaucracy itself people who have grown up in Stalinism are at cross purposes with those who have been formed in the post-Stalin era. They are separated by different experiences, different ways of thinking, and different approaches to crucial issues. The Soviet Union is an extremely young country. Half of its population consists of people who are under 26 years of age. The middle generation has had a huge gap torn in it by the last war, when the Soviet Union lost 20 million people on the battlefields, under Nazi occupation, and in Nazi concentration camps. Those 20 million belonged to the middle generation. The old "Stalinist" age groups are on the way out, although they are still clinging to power. The Communist Party is considerably older than the nation; one half of its members are over 40. One may say that the Party is 16 to 20 years older than the nation at

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large. This does not make for a common language between them. (True, the young people are organized in the *Komsomol*, but that organization is more an instrument for taming them than for giving them influence on national affairs.) In the coming decade we are going to witness a dramatic rejuvenation of the political, administrative, and cultural cadres of the USSR, of the ruling groups, and of those layers of the population that matter in public life. Something like an explosion of youth is coming; a vast invasion and irruption of new age groups into every field of national activity.

The present ruling group sees this coming, is afraid, and is hiding its head in the sand of crypto-Stalinism. To be sure, no one can say what the young stand for; to what extent they have been touched by the corroding cynicism of these years; how sensitive they may be to those influences from the West that seek to sap their confidence in socialism; and to what extent they may be handicapped by lack of political experience or moral fiber. Yet it would be foolish to take a pessimistic view and to overlook the advantages and the immense potentialities of the new generation. The moral vigor and the creative powers of this generation have not been affected by the traumas and inhibitions that crippled the minds and the will of the old. Its members have grown up in a publicly owned economy and an expanding society; they receive a far better education than their parents had; and they should be able to raise the standard of Soviet politics to a much higher socialist level than anything seen so far.

What place did foreign policy and relations between the Communist Parties occupy at the Congress?

Here again a reaction against the slogans and clichés, if not against the policies, of Khrushchevism was noticeable. The Party leaders, with the exception perhaps of Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, spoke far less than Khrushchev did about "peaceful coexistence." No one invoked the "spirits" of Geneva or of Camp David. The accents and the emphasis were different. The keynote of nearly all speeches

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was the Soviet Union's solidarity with the oppressed peoples and classes fighting against imperialism and capitalism all over the world. American imperialism was not spared. Kosygin and Brezhnev did not appeal, as Khrushchev used to, to the "rational and sane" elements in the American ruling class; they denounced President Johnson's administration as a whole. Here too the impact of the war in Vietnam made itself felt (although the European situation and the formation of a Washington-Bonn axis was and is causing anxiety).

The reticence the Congress observed vis à vis China fitted in this context. Despite the fact that the Chinese refused to send their representatives to Moscow, nothing was said against them from the platform of the Congress. The leaders spoke of their friendship for the Chinese Party and government and of their desire for a conciliation. This was all the more remarkable in view of the fact that shortly before the Congress, foreign Communist Parties had received from the Soviet Party letters bitterly denouncing the Chinese. The prudent attitude the Soviet leaders showed towards China at the Congress may conceal conflicting attitudes. It may be merely a tactical maneuver designed to isolate the Chinese; the Russian leaders had discovered that their own reticence was paying them handsome dividends; they had got the North Koreans, the North Vietnamese, and the South Vietnamese to Moscow despite the Chinese boycott. (The events in Indonesia, however, were the most severe blow to the Chinese, who had inspired the Indonesian Party during all the years of its cooperation with Sukarno, a cooperation which ended in its inglorious defeat and collapse.) Clever tacticians in Moscow know that the more "politely" they behave towards the Chinese, the less they engage in the mud-slinging beloved by Khrushchev, the more they gain credit in the Communist movement. Outward reticence may thus very well go hand-in-hand with a kind of continued war of nerves against the Chinese behind the scenes. But the reticence may also express a real anxiety over the widening rift and a genuine desire to mend the relations between Moscow and Peking. Probably both these attitudes are there, each taken by different people; and the Congress provided a common de-

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nominator for conflicting motives. In this situation the Chinese, with their exaggerated attacks on the Russians and their refusal to coordinate activities in Vietnam, are putting themselves in the wrong and provide grist to the mills of the anti-Chinese elements in all Communist Parties. Chou En-lai or Liu Shao-chi would have achieved more by stating their case from the platform of the Congress than by absenting themselves.

To sum up the results of the Congress: I think that the Congress has not contributed much to solving any of the problems that confronted it. Any attempt to recreate the monolith of the Stalin era, even without the Stalinist terror, is bound to fail, as such attempts have failed repeatedly ever since 1953. To the tightening of the reins by the Party leaders the mass of Party members and non-Party people is sure to respond with more intense frustration and discontent. The ideological ferments will grow, and the results of this Congress will prove to be even more shaky and short-lived than were those of the Twenty-second Congress, which was presided over by Khrushchev. The dull and muffled bureaucratic parade was something of a stop-gap. The unresolved problems and dilemmas of this Time of Trouble will go on calling for urgent and clear socialist solutions.

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Yevtushenko?

"I'm not afraid of atom bombs,"
Said Khrushchev, "And they know it;
I'm not afraid of anything—
Except, perhaps, a poet."

—E. Y. Harburg
From *Rhymes for the Irreverent*

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SPAIN: A REPORT

BY N. L. TERUEL

Next month, July 1966, marks the 30th anniversary of the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, that fateful struggle which did so much to shape the political history of the 1930's. Since our special July-August issue will be devoted entirely to the recent coup in Ghana, we are publishing this report on Spain one month before the actual anniversary date. The author is a member of the Spanish underground who, for obvious reasons, is obliged to use a pen name.—*The Editors*

This article is not meant to be a history of the Franco dictatorship, but rather a report on the complex situation that confronts Spain today at the end of one era and the crossroads leading to another. The historical, cultural, and geographic diversity of Spain makes it impossible to deal in detail with many matters of interest, such as the problems of the provinces, where the people still show an unquenchable vitality after 27 years of dictatorship. An historical study of Francoism would require not an article but several volumes.

Spain and Neocapitalism

Fifteen years of *official* economic nationalism, emphasizing self-sufficiency, independence from foreign capital, etc., in a wholly Fascist style, have now yielded before a neocapitalistic superstructure which pretends to imitate Western European patterns in formulating such great schemes as the 1959 Stabilization Plan and the 1964 Development Plan. The Franco regime creates the myth of a Spanish "miracle," and declares its readiness, through these Plans, to give the country 25 more years of this miracle and of peace. The propaganda machine constantly grinds out the equivalent of the slogan, "Spaniards never had it so good." This is true for certain sectors of the population who, in company with tourists and the ever-gullible, may choose to swallow it; but it is not true for most Spaniards, as will be demonstrated.

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What is omitted from the propaganda is that these Plans, made for the benefit of an agricultural-financial oligarchy, rest on spurious foundations. For example, in the seven years since the Stabilization Plan was inaugurated, the cost of living has risen over 50 percent, and through inflation is now rising by over 10 percent yearly. The 1964 Development Plan (a failure according to most economists not living off it) was based mainly on foreign investment* combined with the strength of the peseta as a convertible currency.

The stability of the peseta is achieved, despite a perpetual $1 billion balance-of-trade deficit, through non-utilization of productive investment, and hoarding of the foreign currency earned. The latter, amounting to $704.6 million in 1963 and reckoned at over $1 billion for 1965,** is earned through two channels:

(1) *Tourism.* Spain entertained over 15 million tourists in 1965. Foreign currency earned by this means brings in its train expenditure on non-productive investments, dependence on the economic well-being of the middle class in nine or ten countries, spiritual and material corruption of large sectors of the population, and the alienation from the economy of thousands of square miles of land.

(2) *Export of surplus labor.* Hundreds of thousands of Spanish workers go to France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland each year. They then send remittances to their families in hard currency that are a net benefit to the foreign stability of the peseta, amounting to almost $200 million in 1963, and expected to reach $300 million in 1965.

These two factors bring to light another important issue: the difference between the false boom conditions in the heart of the large cities, and the squalor existing on their peripheries, in small towns and in most of the countryside, especially in Extremadura, Andalucía, Castilla, and Galicia. Here produc-

*The Plan carried recognition for the first time that companies might be under full foreign control.

**These figures, as well as those pertaining to education, etc., are taken from the latest *Anuario Estadístico de España* (Spanish Statistical Yearbook) and the latest report of the Banco Exterior de España (a rough equivalent of the Export-Import Bank).

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tion relationships are still semi-feudal and the worker is progressively pauperized in absolute terms. With their starvation wages (when there is work), the villages are becoming empty, though in some places this can mean better wages for those who stay. Food-crop and cattle production is decreasing yearly in a country in which over 30 percent of the active population is engaged in agriculture!

The countryside, where concentration of capital is centuries old and production relationships have remained unchanged except for the timid reforms of 1931-1936, is the sector where performance has improved the least and in some cases has deteriorated. Industry was given a free rein following the disruption of the Civil War and, in a country then lacking all kinds of manufactured goods, has increased both in capacity and production, but in no way comparably with other European countries. The most successful sectors have been production of steel and machine tools, and even of most consumer goods with the exception of automobiles (not actually manufactured in Spain until 1950 and since then under foreign licenses). Housing is still *totally* inadequate for 80 percent of the rural population and over 50 percent of the urban.

On the other hand, the financial sector has grown enormously. Six big banks control all kinds of enterprises and, with their associates and ramifications, dominate over 50 percent of the whole Spanish economy. They are also the intermediaries which get most of the benefits from foreign-controlled firms. They engage in boundless speculation in land, oil, tourism, minerals, and imports, investing everywhere and becoming more and more powerful. Power does not really change hands, however; the "old families" have entered the financial field with vigor, and the landowners are basically the same persons who control banking, and thereby control financial activities.

In this situation the expansionist Common Market presents a dilemma to the hitherto self-contained Spanish economy. The Common Market, creation of international monopoly capitalism, follows an ambivalent policy toward the regime which it helped to install. Under the guise of rejecting Francoism, or at least of lamenting the absence of a liberal democracy, the

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members deny Spain the entry into the European Economic Community for which it begs, and at the same time make use of Spain's new policy on foreign capital by investing heavily in that country. They are gradually making of Spain a joint EEC-USA colony—and a very profitable one because consumption in significant volume is only beginning. So long as profitability is assured, it is more advantageous for EEC members to import Spanish workers, who are not protected by EEC joint agreements and even lack labor unions to represent them, and to make investments in Spain where wages are low, workers are "well behaved," and profits are often 40 percent per year. In this sorry way Spain's industrialization proceeds.

Moreover, many of Spain's primary products, such as citrus fruit, olive oil, etc., which account for a great part of its exports, must now compete in their traditional markets with similar products from Italy, France, Greece, Algeria, Israel—countries that belong to, or are associates of, the Common Market and hence receive preferential treatment.

The Social Structures

These economic factors show how durable are certain power structures that launched and won the Civil War. Their inner relationships have evolved but without altering their relations with the exploited. In order to maintain their enormous profits they must now follow the Western European model, and hurriedly impose a consumers' society at any price. That is, they must liberalize credit, keep unemployment low but not raise real wages too much (the export of labor is in part a result of this policy), and perpetuate the speculative expansion system though it may be inflationary. This is relatively easy to do because there are none of the controls in Spain that exist in the democratic capitalistic countries, such as trade unions, political parties, a "free" press, so that the opposition is literally without means of action. When all information media are totally controlled by the dominant class, there is an absolute lack of information for the dominated class.

Since 1939 the exploited have suffered in addition an intense process of social and political de-education, of frag-

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mentation into individual atoms, that until recently worked very well for the oligarchy. It produced a social alienation in which football, the movies, the press, and specious *flamenco* played the role of circuses. These distractions, together with the general policy of silence, were useful, as well as very profitable, for the rulers.

Furthermore, consumption at any price has been promoted. For the workers, this means credit to buy such goods as motorcycles and TV sets on long and ruinous terms—goods that otherwise they could not afford on their miserable wages.Every year it becomes more difficult to rent an apartment in the cities; the enterprises or the syndicates that are Franco's "vertical" trade unions give long-term loans which immobilize the worker, for if he is fired for striking or "political agitation," he is subject not only to imprisonment and torture but also to the immediate loss of home, furniture, etc.* This system attempts to gloss over the freezing of real wages by increasing credit facilities whose actual effect is to tie the would-be beneficiary more rigidly to his job. It also avoids conspicuous intervention by the police.

Spanish workers when organizing for a strike are faced with all the usual difficulties experienced by underground organizations, plus those added by the existence of surplus labor (despite export of labor) and the fact that the employed have nothing but debts. These economic restraints are superimposed on a working class that since 1939 has suffered both full-scale brainwashing and continuing and ruthless repression.

A decidedly opposite effect, as the government is just beginning to realize, is produced by the emigration of hundreds of thousands of workers for whom there is either no work in Spain or badly paid work. First, they go to countries where they can observe directly how a representative trade union works, even if it confines itself entirely to economic demands. Secondly, they get in touch with Spanish exiles of all persuasions and all periods since 1939. Communist and socialist exiles kindle the socio-political unrest felt by those who have lived in Spain under the absolute domination of one class and then

*Cases of Pegaso in Madrid, Fabra y Coats in Barcelona, Empresa Nacional Bazán in Coruña.

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have had to leave families behind because of discriminatory regulations imposed on foreign workers by the countries to which they migrate. Many of the emigrants return with or without savings, but in any case the younger workers are by no means the same as when they left.

Moreover, it is not only workers who emigrate. Many university graduates are forced to do likewise. All over the world, hospitals and universities, radio stations and international organizations, have Spanish staff or keep receiving applications from Spain. In Spain the alliance between workers and intellectuals is traditional and unbreakable, for Spain is one of the countries where intellectual work is not divorced from work with the hands.

The dominant Spanish oligarchies have always been loath to give the people education. Thus, illiteracy south of Madrid amounted *officially* in 1962 to 17 percent of the adult population, and in provinces given over to latifundia and olive culture like Jaén, to over 50 percent. To these illiterates must be added a very large number who, after becoming officially literate, forget how to read and write because they have no money for books or newspapers which, in any event, say little that affects them or can change their situation.

Secondary education does not reach even 20 percent of the people in the age groups that receive it elsewhere. In the first place, Spanish workers, despite their traditional hunger for learning, are compelled by economic conditions to start working as soon as possible, since "he who does not work does not eat." Secondly, this necessity is aggravated by the lack of sufficient free or low-cost secondary schools, since tuition fees have to be paid even in government secondary schools. There are fewer than 400 of these *Institutos* in just 90 towns. Madrid, with about three million people, has fewer than ten *Institutos*, even when boys' and girls' schools are counted separately, coeducation being forbidden. While there are "Labor Secondary Schools" or "Universities" that give vocational training and general education, most of them are under the rule of the Church or the Falange, and their faculties are "trustworthy,"

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i.e., incompetent. They are centers for perverting the students' real interests and deceiving outsiders.

Both national and labor secondary schools have miserly budgets and limited capacity: tens of thousands of applications for registration must be rejected annually. As a result, over 70 percent of those who do manage to obtain secondary education, have to attend Church schools on the Church's conditions. There, teaching is for the rich (in Spain the small middle class is considered comparatively "rich"), who are taught how to remain rich; an average 20 percent of the poor are accepted "out of charity," get a second-class education, and are taught to remain poor.

There is a small system of private schools, which are as costly as Church schools because they must employ university graduates.* They are in any event institutions for the bourgeoisie. Consequently, their cost is prohibitive for most of the population.

Educational deficiencies become even more obvious in regions like Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia which have their own language and culture, teaching in which has been illegal *de facto* or *de jure* since 1939. There, school children are forced to study in a language, Castilian, which is not their mother tongue.

The result is that in a country with serious illiteracy and a lack of facilities for general education, there is little employment for teachers because there are not enough public schools, and in the Church schools most posts can be filled cheaply by teachers without degrees. In a country without enough doctors, doctors are forced to emigrate due to their excessive number in the cities and the small, fixed number of social welfare posts in the countryside. In a country without engineers, thousands of youngsters have to give up this vocation because the caste system prevailing in the schools admits only a fixed number—larger now than ten years ago—and closes the doors to those who cannot afford ten years of training. Engineering training is prolonged; first of all it takes many years to pass entrance

*Something the Church is not always required to do, and can escape by equating its own diplomas with those granted by a university.

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examinations, and later on, graduation is restricted to a number set low enough to make an engineering diploma a letter-patent of well-being for life.

Finally, in the civil service, reforms that purported to raise the civil servant's status have had the ironic effect of making thousands of civil service posts open only to military officers—who get two salaries—to the exclusion of all other aspirants.

The Political Situation

After the Civil War the Left was beheaded at the top by executions, jailings, and mass exile, and dismembered at the bottom by a repression unprecedented in modern European history. Spain was the only country where fascism had to fight for three years to subdue the people. And the "gentlemen"—a term used by the Marxist historian-in-exile, Ramos Oliveira, in his *History of Spain*—made the people pay for their impudence in resisting them. The situation began to change about 1952, however, and since then the Left can be said to have begun to reorganize *effectively* following the first transport strikes in Barcelona and Madrid.

Every year since there have been political stirrings instigated by workers and/or students. Repression is harsh, and while political executions as such are few (the last was Grimau's), thousands of workers and students—Asturian miners, Basque and Madrid metal workers, Catalan textile workers, Andalusian peasants, students from all the universities, the list is endless—have gone to jail during the last fifteen years. This accelerating trend to politicalization, despite all kinds of governmental repression, proves that Spain is again going forward.

Since 1952 for workers and 1956 for students, each new chapter in the struggle against the dictatorship marks a new advance for the progressive forces. Year by year, the working class is growing stronger and better organized, and recently has been able to create illegal, but acknowledged, Workers' Committees (*Comisiones Obreras*). This development was inevitable, given the Spanish workers' living conditions. The dictatorship, after imposing and defending these conditions, preaches sanctimoniously to those who have nothing that no

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one lives better or in a more "socially just" society than they; it everlastingly extols the blessings of "order," which means repression in order to maintain its exploitation.

There have been similar stirrings in the universities and among the intellectuals. On the one hand, the pro-regime "intellectuals" are so discredited that anyone with intellectual integrity must spurn their solutions. On the other hand, those who offer honest solutions are systematically attacked and outlawed by the regime. Sartre or Lukacs, Marx or Darwin (and until six or seven years ago, Ortega or Unamuno, Machado or Lorca) do not exist except as whipping-boys. History or philosophy, even medicine or law, are but battlegrounds between "good guys" and "bad guys," between respectable people and trouble-makers, between Catholics and heretics, no matter whether the subject be dialectical materialism or evolution, nuclear physics or psychosomatic medicine.

Under these conditions, the easiest course for many university students, 99 percent of whom come from bourgeois families, is merely to drift and not look for problems. Nevertheless, the germs of dissatisfaction with incompetence, mendacity, and injustice, have proliferated to the point where today's activist minority in the universities is strong enough to put the government in check every year at two or three institutions. This trend is furthered by the fact that Francoist justifications of the Civil War as a "crusade," and insistence that sacrifices are necessary lest "the reds destroy Spain again," no longer convince the growing number who were born during or after the Civil War, and who see the truth beneath the systematic pattern of lies to which they have been subjected.

The unity of action beginning to be achieved by both intellectuals and workers is but a start, however, and only achieved after long years of divisions and rivalries. The working class has experienced many setbacks because of antagonism between the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*—PSOE), a member of the Second International and representing extreme right-wing social democracy, and the Communist Party of Spain (*Partido Comunista de España*—PCE). The increasing divergence between

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the Central Committee of the PCE (most of it outside Spain) and the bulk of its followers led to the appearance of the Popular Liberation Front (*Frente de Liberación Popular*—FLP), an extreme-left group decimated by the police between 1961 and 1963, and to the later appearance of a pro-Chinese faction in the PCE. Anarchist remnants have advocated general direct action, but of a rabidly anti-communist character; this was an unrealistic line because the very fact that the dictatorship rightly considers the PCE its worst enemy made the working class incapable of acting against the PCE. Thus, the period 1952-1960 can be defined as one of abortive renaissance in which political action lost 90 percent of its efficiency through internal rivalries in the Left.

Since about 1960 the situation has changed. The base of each group, which bears the burden of the struggle, understood the sterility of divided action and began to impose unity of action from the base upward. The appearance of Catholic labor unions separate from the syndicates—"Christian revolutionary" in tone and set up at first by the Church as a guarantee against dissatisfaction and insurance for the future—acts as a catalyst, and underground action finds support in a legal, and up to a point "respectable," organization. Though repression is still ruthless, it is now impossible to cry out "Moscow gold" and "international communism" each time the workers take action.

The Spanish University Students Democratic Federation (*Federación Universitaria Democrática de España*—FUDE) was formed in Madrid after 1961, and all leftist student organizations, overcoming former rivalries, agreed to cooperate and act together. The FUDE and its branches or counterparts in the other universities reached an implicit agreement, if not for all-out unity of action, at least for cooperation with the Union of Democratic Students (*Unión de Estudiantes Democráticos*—UDE), a smaller and more recent leftish Christian Democratic group.

All these agreements and actions, it must be remembered, are achieved in the midst of a repression carried out jointly by the Social-Political Brigade of the Police, the Civil Guard, and the Military Information Services, which together arrest

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hundreds of persons every year, so that all leftist organizations are periodically crippled and have to be reorganized from the bottom.

In the last four years the results achieved through unity of action have been the great Asturias strikes, and lesser strikes in Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, and Valencia, and vigorous movements in all the universities. Unity of action works, and each movement that is even partially successful helps to weaken the government, which is losing its capacity to assure "public order"—an essential element if it wants to keep power, and one that must be maintained in defense of the interests of foreign and domestic capital. Each small success makes the Left better appreciate the benefits of unity of action and gives the policy more support, something that is imperative since until now all unity of action agreements have been on specific, not general, issues. And a general agreement on unity of action is essential if this unity and a dynamic and peaceful coexistence between various groups in the Left are to endure after Franco's eventual disappearance.

Meanwhile, the Right also tends to split, thanks to the inexorable mechanics of history and to economic interests. The latter, after the monolithic unity imposed by the desperate defense of property during the Civil War, are divided into several groups, some of which support continuance of the system; others support dictatorship disguised as a purported liberalization, or even a future formal democracy with a strong executive branch. Still others search for a compromise solution, with or without a monarchy, intended to reduce the trend toward radicalization.

It is evident that the impossibility of an immediate revolution, as well as the need to modernize and make more efficient the economic and political structures that are less and less capable of making the transition toward a consumer-oriented society, forces the Right to survey the future as something at least superficially different from the past. The problem for the Right is how to defend its varied interests with maximum efficiency in the future. This problem underlies all divisions as well as such developments as the present support by part of the "have" classes of a "democratization" that will allow them to

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keep their margin of profit through a European-style buying-off of the proletariat, and the setting up of certain liberal superstructures that weaken the Left's immediate demands.

Another group maintains that liberalization, however minimal, implies many compromises. These would mean the appearance of legal political parties and well-structured organizations (and, therefore, the danger of great political reforms), and also a general rise in the standard of living which might imply a lowering of the enormous profits to be gotten in Spain.

Franco has faced the problem, characteristically, by adopting a temporary and specious way out: the pseudo-liberalization policy—especially personified in Fraga, the unctuous and astute Minister of Information and Tourism—which consists of allowing a few books and films to be imported, acknowledging that strikes "if they don't go against the nation's interests" may be legal, and recognizing that an illegal, and therefore guilty, opposition exists. On top of it all is the sinister swindle of the Press Law.

But a real censorship still exists, education is even harder to get, more and more workers are exported to Europe, and repression is as brutal as before—witness the castrations, rapings, and crippling beatings in Asturias in 1962 and 1963. Students and professors are expelled from the universities of Madrid and Barcelona. Grimau is murdered. Inside Spain, this policy deceives only those who are always willing to be deceived. Abroad, through a well-financed and well-run campaign, the regime attempts to win the necessary respectability so that the governments of the NATO-EEC Holy Alliance can increase even more their aid to Franco, and to their own investors, without creating a too adverse public opinion.

Fraga's pseudo-liberalization tries to satisfy the semi-enlightened Right, which supports timid reforms as long as its privileges are not taken away, and to weaken the Left abroad. In this objective the regime is supported by the international press, from the *New York Times*, which devotes more space to the so-called "spectacular progress" of Franco's Spain than to real conditions or to the anti-Franco struggle, to the London

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Observer, which purports to consider Fraga the great reformer from inside.

Western confederates range from United States Presidents who maintain bases in Spain, give billions of dollars in economic "aid," and hold joint maneuvers with the Spanish Army of Occupation against an eventual "subversive enemy," through De Gaulle who includes Spain in his "Europe of the Fatherlands" and systematically harasses the Spanish leftist refugees, to the Chancellors of the Fourth Reich who pay pensions to the Blue Division veterans and give billions of marks in credit to Spanish industrialists.

This false facade of an internally evolving liberalization is therefore nothing but an alibi of respectability for the all-holy "public order" that keeps dividends high for Spanish and foreign investors. But, as has been shown, the blood-letting of the Spanish people goes on, structures remain unchanged, not the least income redistribution is carried out, and political centralism persists, as well as repression against all parties and all regions in a Spain that is as divided between exploiters and exploited as it was in 1868 or in 1939.

There is no doubt, then, that Spain is at a crossroads, but it is impossible to foresee which direction it will follow. Despite the appearance of a positive trend toward unity in the Left and toward splitting in the Right, both processes have but begun, and there is a long road ahead. The Right is still entirely capable of reorganization in the face of a frontal assault on its interests, and in the Left there still persist the traditional divisive groupings whose leaders remain from the generation that fought and lost the Civil War. The splits remain even though the base imposes unity of action. Unity is the only method with a positive potential in a Spain where repression, lack of cohesive social life, and semi-feudal hangovers endure, together with all the structural problems that since 1808 have resulted in a series of civil wars and brief progressive periods followed by long years of repression.

In the underground, in which each minimally active group is soon cut down, a united Left can either win against pseudo-

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liberalization, or perish again, divided. The Right will try to make the workers its accomplices, as it has done in France, England, Germany. But, as this report implies, the Spanish situation is different: its workers cannot become accomplices of an imperialism or neocolonialism that do not exist. If Europe's salvation is to come from the South, from the countries where capitalism is still harsh as in Greece, Portugal, Italy—countries where the proletariat is not yet the favorite partner of imperialist monopoly capitalism—Spain may still have an important role to play. To evade this destiny the enlightened Right will try, as in the other countries of this group, to impose a European-style "solution," but the Neanderthal Right will oppose it. At the moment it seems probable that the enlightened wing will be the stronger when Franco disappears; this event, together with the positive trend on the Left, may give the Left another great chance, like the one wasted between 1931 and 1936.

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THE TRICONTINENTAL: CONCRETE INTERNATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION

BY JOSE VAZEILLES

The article which follows appeared in the Uruguayan weekly *Marcha* of April 29th. It is a reply, which seems to us altogether convincing, to Adolfo Gilly's criticism of the Tricontinental published in both *Marcha* and in MONTHLY REVIEW (April issue) and presents a view from inside the conference which MR readers are entitled to know about. The author is identified in the article itself.—*The Editors*

The Tricontinental Conference of Havana has unleashed a polemic which appears to share all the negative characteristics of those which periodically arise on the Left. The Movement for National Liberation [MLN], as the representative of which I was a member of the Argentine delegation to the Tricontinental, refuses to enter into polemics of this kind with other revolutionary and socialist organizations or to take part in those which arise among them, except when it deems that they are of real interest to the tasks of the revolution in our country or when we are in some way implicated in them.

We affirm the need for theory, the necessity for discussion; we don't believe in the value of practice in and of itself. But we try to extract from the experience of the Argentine Left—a Left which until now has demonstrated its ineffectiveness in transforming the reality of our country, that is, in being really revolutionary—lessons which will permit us to overcome this condition.

There are two fundamental reasons why we today find ourselves obliged to intervene in the polemic touched off by the Tricontinental:

(A) To prove his line of argument, Gilly has referred to the Argentine delegation, of which the MLN formed a part; and he has given a description of the delegation and of the Congress which we consider erroneous.

Gilly's description of the Cuban Revolution and of the political lines in the Latin American and world revolutionary

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movements is distorted and does not conform to reality. Its danger appears to us much greater, given the relative lack of development of the revolutionary process in this part of the continent (the southern "cone"), and the ineffectiveness and distortions of our thinking and of organizations of the Left.

For a Left which is on the whole ineffective, which has not yet found out how to succeed in acquiring influence with the popular classes, and which quite rightly rejects the reformism of the traditional bureaucratic Communist Parties, but which hasn't the capacity for work nor the mixture of imagination and patience which is indispensable for transforming this reality of the southern "cone" (much more complicated and less dramatic than that of the rest of Latin America)—for this Left to accept the picture that Gilly presents would be to risk activating all its negative tendencies.

(B) But in the particular case of Gilly, there is something more serious: he supports his distorted interpretation of reality by twisting the facts. The MLN will soon publish a complete report about the Conference. Here we will limit ourselves to exposing some of Gilly's distortions: the invented and false facts.

(1) *Gilly's invention*: "In the Mexican delegation were the bourgeois politicians of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), which supports the capitalist government of Díaz Ordaz."

The true fact: The PSP, which Vicente Lombardo Toledano heads, was not included in the Mexican delegation. And this was precisely because its conciliatory attitudes toward the government of Díaz Ordaz brought members of the Mexican MLN (National Liberation Movement) to refuse to accept its presence. This exclusion of the PSP brought about a rupture of the MLN members with the Mexican CP, which was working for an agreement with Lombardo Toledano. The Mexican CP appealed to the Conference Preparatory Committee in Havana, and its request for an invitation to the PSP was refused by the Committee. That is, the PSP and the Mexican CP were not included in the delegation precisely because of the opposition which the PSP policy of support for the Mexican

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government aroused in the MLN, and this decision was supported by the Preparatory Committee in Havana.

(2) *Gilly's invention*: "The Argentine votes were carried by the Argentine CP. . . ."

The true fact: The Argentine delegation was composed of seven members who represented the following organizations: The "Cooke" Peronist group, the CP, the Movement of Labor Unity and Cooperation (MUCS) (controlled by the CP), the Movement of National Liberation (MLN), the Party of the Popular Vanguard (PVP), the Argentine University Federation (FUA) (where the CP has strong influence but not control), and the Coordinating Board of Political Youth (MCJP) originated by the CP but composed of Christian Democrats, Progressive Democrats, and Peronists, and whose representative, note, was a Peronist. In the questions of dispute which arose at the Conference, there was each time a majority in the delegation (comprising the Cooke group, the PVP, the MCJP, and the MLN) which imposed its position on a minority formed of the CP and the MUCS, with the FUA remaining generally in intermediate positions. This is what happened when there was a vote on the site of the Permanent Committee of the Tricontinental, regarding which the majority of the delegation was firmly in favor of Havana, while the CP preferred Cairo; or when the delegation had to vote in favor of creating the Latin American Organization of Solidarity, which the Argentine CP (together with the other traditional CP's) opposed without success. But even more: the CP held that after the Tricontinental, the Argentine delegation should be dissolved and that the National Committee of Solidarity, the composion of which the CP did not approve, should also be dissolved. In all these questions, the CP was in the minority. So the CP not only did not "carry the votes of the delegation" but on the contrary was in disagreement with the majority with respect to the delegation's positions.

(3) *Gilly's invention*: "In the case of the Latin American delegations, there was imposed the arbitrary decision of the pro-Moscow CP's."

The true fact: In *eight* countries the CP had no repre-

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sentation: Peru, Panama, Haiti, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the three Guayanas. In *three* countries the CP was in the minority: Brazil, Argentina, the Dominican Republic. In *two* countries, Cuba and Guatemala, the CP follows the revolutionary line (armed struggle). In *one* country, Paraguay, the CP forms part of a revolutionary front. In *one* country, Venezuela, the revolutionary wing of the CP together with the parallel wing of the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), forms the political command of the guerrillas (both organizations have wings which propose the peaceful way, but these had no representative at the Conference).

In other words, a total of 15 delegations openly supported the line of revolution. To these we must add countries where, due to the internal relation of forces, the CP's openly supporting the reformist line could not freely change, like Chile (represented by the FRAP, half Socialist Party and half CP, and where the Socialists gambled on the revolutionary line), Bolivia (where there was representation of the two CP's—Soviet line and Chinese line—and the PRIN of Lechin). And even Colombia, where the leadership of the CP—of reformist leanings—still hasn't figured out how to deal with the powerful guerrilla movement it has on its hands (the free republic of Marquetalia) and therefore acted neutrally. There remain no more than a few countries whose delegations were able to act in favor of the traditional reformist line of the CP's: El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Ecuador, Nicaragua (whose reformism has slight chance with Tachito Somoza), and Uruguay —six in all. One could add that the Brazilian CP (Prestes' party) shows itself publicly to be in a process of such agonizing self-criticism in connection with the fall of Goulart that it doesn't dare to defend the peaceful line. The other part of the Brazilian delegation was composed of a front consisting in part of Brizolaists, the CP of Brazil (Chinese line) and a group from the independent Left postulating the need for armed struggle. But I believe that I have said enough.

The False Conclusions of Gilly

"With the pretext of unity," writes Gilly, "the Cuban lead-

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ership wants to impose on the guerrilla movements this alliance [this refers to the alliance with the traditional Communist Parties of reformist line]. It wants them to rehabilitate the CP's and in consequence submit to their policy of conciliation."

Is this why the Cubans, in the Preparatory Committee, supported the independents of the Mexican MLN in their position of not admitting the PSP, which brought with it the withdrawal of the Mexican CP? Is this why the Preparatory Committee decided against the position of the Argentine CP on the inclusion of the MLN and PVP, sending them their tickets directly? Is this why, in the Peruvian delegation, the only representative was the Coordinating Commander of the guerrillas, and the same was true of the Venezuelan delegation? Could this be why the Cuban Prime Minister raised insistently in his speeches the necessity for armed struggle? Could this be why not only the armed movements of Latin America but also those of other continents, such as that of Angola, recognize Cuba as the socialist state which sustains the most meaningful line of support for their revolutionary action? Finally, could it be for this reason that during the whole conference, the Cuban delegation worked in closest contact with the positions of the delegations of the two Vietnams and Venezuela?

The True Conclusions

Gilly hides information, invents facts, twists positions, and extracts false conclusions.

The real conclusions that can be extracted from the facts are these:

(1) The Latin American revolutionary movement (and that of the other continents) grows day by day. And, given the fact that the axis of the struggle between the two systems passes at this moment through the countries in process of liberation, the revolutionary movements of the subjugated countries acquire greater and greater importance in the international field, pressuring the great socialist powers to take them more and more into account.

(2) The recognition that each revolutionary process has its own dynamic, determined by the internal forces of each

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country, is reaffirmed. And, in consequence, the movements which engage in revolutionary practice do not want to become enmeshed in polemics which depart from a concrete internationalism based in the practical coordination of the struggle.

(3) The Cuban revolution has not abandoned its revolutionary principles; it has translated them into deeds, above all in relation to Hispanic-Amrecia.

(4) Therefore, and in parallel step with Cuba, the liberation movements grow, as the authentic expression of the need of our peoples, from within. And they don't exist as a consequence of Russian influence, regardless of what the United States State Department, Gilly, and the currents who call themselves Trotskyist might wish.

(5) This dynamic progressively imposes a clear revolutionary line which the reformists cannot hold back because it is nourished by action and experience.

(6) Despite the difficulties of communication to which imperialism subjects us, and despite the distortions produced by the lucubrations of the abstract Left, the revolutionary movements have arrived at common basic conclusions, which must now be shared in a process of mutual instruction.

What can these things mean for our people?

Hope, confidence in the revolutionary movements and in the socialist revolution, revolutionary union, an impulse to action and experience through action.

So long as there is honesty, the discrepancies are, for me and for the MLN of Argentina, totally legitimate. The revolutionaries of distinct organizations work for the victory of the people with perspectives, strategies, and tactics which differ; only success will indicate which are the valid ones. And, respecting this principle, it is an obligation of all revolutionaries to respect any other revolutionary comrade. But it is also their obligation to proclaim the truth, to demand that he who speaks from this side of the firing lines use the truth to construct his interpretations.

We will offer our testimony and a much more complete report of the facts than could fit into a *Marcha* article in the report which the MLN will publish about the Conference. And

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we urge, because we risk our own destiny in the revolution, that those who speak in the name of the revolution use the truth.

The revolution is not only a serious matter, but also rigorous and difficult. The harm done by one who represents himself as a member of our own ranks is much graver than that which is done by the enemy.

For what does it mean to run down Cuba which, for the masses, is the symbol of the socialist revolution? What does it mean to picture Latin American delegates who, with arms in hand, are developing a solid revolutionary practice, as a flock of sheep, abject, servile to Moscow? What does it mean to run down the Tricontinental Conference, enormous advance of world socialism and of the liberation movements over Bandung? What does it mean to seek this aim by means of lies, inventions, distortions?

It means to fool, confuse, discourage the people and the revolutionary ranks. Let's leave this work to imperialism.

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CORRESPONDENCE

Our April issue—containing the part of Fidel Castro's speech at the close of the Tricontinental Conference which attacked Adolfo Gilly, Gilly's answer, and an editorial giving our own position on the issues involved—evoked an unusually heavy mail, most of it critical. We publish below three of the more interesting letters, reserving the right to reply in a later issue.—*The Editors*

Shocked by the April Issue

I know MONTHLY REVIEW has been in the forefront of the defenders of the Cuban Revolution; thus it came as an even greater shock to read the April issue featuring your discussion of the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, and the article by Adolfo Gilly.

Of course, criticism is everyone's prerogative—though often enough there is gratuitous criticism without evidence of error. But I submit that one should easily recognize the criticism of friends from the criticism of enemies. And, a friend should be guided in his criticism according to whom he is addressing. There is no excuse for patronizing and disparaging Fidel Castro —I find it painful, intolerable.

(Is it possible that North American radicals, like North American reactionaries, indulge the traditionally condescending attitudes toward "Latins"? How different from Jean Paul Sartre's attitude when he writes: "They have the sobriety of Latins. The foreigners came to get drunk at the Vedado between the walls of their hotel. But even under Batista the Cubans were loath to drink.")

Besides, upon reflection, don't you think it is bad politics and supremely bad taste to employ a tone of condescension in addressing the only giant this hemisphere has known during this century? To make sober and respectful criticism is very different from rapping Fidel on the knuckles as the hot-headed Latin boy.

It seems incredible to me that MONTHLY REVIEW could join

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the "where is *el Che*?" chorus of nasty implications. I do think that your equating Che's non-appearance with the Moscow Trials could be described as indeed "ugly and ominous." It is infantile to suggest, as Gilly does on page 27, that Che should have sent a message to the Tricontinental Conference. What would prevent the doubters and the enemies from claiming that any message sent had been forged?

What has Fidel done until now that would make anyone think of him as other than the most humane leader in modern history?

What, oh Lord, must a man do to prove his courage, his dedication, his sincerity, his honesty, his abnegation, etc., every minute of his life, as Fidel has done, to win a measure of trust from his contemporaries?

I love and admire Che even as I love and admire Fidel—it is gratuitous to assign order of primacy in this context. But since you have brought it up, I would like to indicate (and I am certain that in his remarkable intelligence and honesty Che would agree) that it is Fidel who embodies the Revolution and has thus "come to symbolize all that is best, all that is pure, all that is beloved in the Cuban Revolution," for the simple reason that it was to Fidel that all the people rallied, it was Fidel who could draw personalities of the stature of Dr. Guevara. It was Fidel's cry for independence—the audacious attack on Moncada—which began to make history in 1953, that opened the way for Cuba to reclaim its trampled sovereignty and its long overdue self-determination. No Cuban, no true revolutionary, doubts who the "Maximum Leader" is, who the Liberator of Cuba is—Fidel Castro.

And for that matter, no imperialist doubts who the Liberator of Cuba is, either. It is for them to disparage, to cast doubts, to make dark threats.

If there is one trait that could best of all characterize Fidel, it is his truthfulness. He has always "told it the way it is." Thus, he should be believed when he says: "Some day mankind will learn all the facts. That will be the day when the villains will see that Comrade Guevara was not murdered; each of his steps will be fully known."

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Anyway, to question Fidel's integrity is purposeless—to put the best face on it. Otherwise, it is only destructive.

I confess that I was astonished to read Adolfo Gilly's piece within the covers of MONTHLY REVIEW. I do not exaggerate when I say that I kept looking at the cover to ascertain that it was indeed the MONTHLY REVIEW I had come to expect. And as I read and re-read, I kept asking myself what possible objective could be achieved by offering Gilly a platform for his rantings against the Cuban Revolution?

(I met Gilly. I had read some of his pieces and, like many other people, had been taken by what we all termed his "perceptiveness" in some of his observations, and his journalistic skill—a young and smart Argentine "charmer" who kept repeating how much he likes Cubans. But *never* in my presence did he utter a word that would lead me to suspect remotely the kind of thinking I discovered later, after his departure, in his article in the Uruguayan periodical *Marcha*, and now in the April issue of MONTHLY REVIEW.)

I began to read the article on the Tricontinental Conference expecting a political document, simply because it was printed within the covers of MONTHLY REVIEW. It could be claimed that Gilly's piece was published in the name of "objectivity." This seems to be its only rationale. I find it very difficult to discuss Gilly's article as a political criticism, because it is not a political argument. But since one must characterize it in order to establish positions, let us say at the outset that, far from being polemical, it has the tone and content of the snarl of a hyena suffering from self-inflicted wounds. (And what an odd reporter—he was *not* present at the Conference and, in fact, has not been in Cuba since 1963, as he told everyone!)

On page 9 of your editorial, you write: "At the Tricontinental Conference Fidel talked a lot about the duty of all revolutionaries to help Vietnam and carry on the struggle against imperialism. Does he now presume to tell the Chinese, who are doing most of the helping and a large part of the struggling, that all that comes after the duty to supply Cuba with the amount of rice it asks for?"

In the April 15 issue of *World Outlook* (page 33), Joseph

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Hansen answers this question very well: "The irony is misplaced. From the viewpoint of defending revolutionary China against the escalating imperialist aggression in Southeast Asia, it would seem well worth while to make sure that no slashes occur in the rice ration of the fighters in the front lines ninety miles from Miami."

Melitta del Villar
New York, April 30, 1966

Disturbed by the April Issue

I am most disturbed by the April issue of MONTHLY REVIEW.

This is a period of polycentrism, both in the domestic socialist movement as well as in international affairs. This is good. The American Left is too small a group to arrogate to itself the right to confine the future Left in ideological and organizational molds. In this historical period we are working out both the forms and theory from which the mass Left movement of the future will grow.

MONTHLY REVIEW is playing an important part in this process, both by raising steadily the question of socialism and by providing a center for socialists of varying persuasions, as well as by its comment on various questions. For MONTHLY REVIEW to make a commitment at this time in factional battles, is an abandonment of its proper role of serving all the Left.

I am disturbed by the equation of Fidel and Gilly. Fidel is obviously a major world personality if history has any validity whatsoever. Moreover he is a personality who has made major contributions to socialism. Gilly is, no matter how able, a journalist. Their opinions and writings do not stand on a par. But the format of the April issue places them on a par (with the editors as judges). I believe Gilly's contribution should have been printed in much shortened form as a letter.

Gilly has been principally published here in MR. It is right that its pages should be open to him for self defense. It is not right that the pages of MR should be used for an attack

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on the Cuban government. I do not mean Fidel is above criticism. I believe he needs it. Gilly's article is not criticism. It breathes the sentiment that Cuba has passed beyond criticism and, being out of the socialist camp, should only be attacked.

At any moment (literally) we Americans may be required to arouse popular sentiment to prevent or end a military attack on Cuba. Gilly's article provides ammunition from the Left to support this attack. For if the policy of Fidel sabotages and holds back the Latin American movement, if there is a "vertiginous political evolution of the Cuban leadership," then it follows the Cuban Revolution can be sacrificed to gain the greater goal of Latin America.

The fact of the matter, as I see it, is that just as on the domestic scene no one group or person has all the answers, so also on the international scene the socialist movements and governments each make a contribution (some more, some less). The day is past when socialist countries were immune from criticism because of international dangers; the day has not yet come—and should not come—when they are attacked in terms to be reserved for enemies.

With due respect to the editors, a respect developed over thirty years, I do not think they are the possessors of all wisdom either. Certainly your editorial comments on Che justify me.

One almost universal characteristic that I have found on the Left is—plain gossip. The Trotskyites now seem to have elevated this into a principle. Assume for one moment that Che is engaged in international revolutionary action, either inside Cuba or based abroad. Cannot there be good and sufficient reasons, in terms of international relations and Che's safety, for keeping this quiet? I do not believe that silence on the question should bring anxiety or doubt to honest socialists—"everywhere" or anywhere. If you have such doubts then I suggest you think for one moment upon the burdens of historical decisions which Fidel must bear, where from the external facts no decision can be 100 percent correct, and resolve these doubts in favor of a man who has generally played very square.

Basil R. Pollitt

Brooklyn, April 10, 1966

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Dullards, That's All

There is an extraordinary element of disingenuousness hiding somewhere between the lines of your articles in the April issue: your lack of candor in the treatment—oblique with you and sneakingly insinuating with Gilly—of the canard that Fidel has murdered Che. Your editors and Gilly, while he was in New York, gave this story out as fact,* buttressed with your own non-Latin opinion that, after all, they're hot-blooded down there and carry guns. So what could be more natural than that Fidel, in a fit of passion, murdered Che? Were you as honest as Fidel, you would have said that you were repeating this story in those days before Fidel brought them out into the open.

I haven't made a revolution and neither have you; but if you can lecture Fidel as political scientists and economists, I think I must lecture you on documents you have misread or are ignorant of. After quoting from Fidel on the reasons the Chinese gave for reducing their rice sales to Cuba (please note it is to Fidel whom you owe this knowledge, not the Chinese), you say, "Does he presume to tell the Chinese, who are doing most of the helping and a large part of the struggling, that all that comes after the duty to supply Cuba with the amount of rice it asks for?" Why don't you report to your readers that in the speech in which Fidel listed the Chinese reasons he not only didn't presume to question them, but added that they were acceptable to him, for Cuba would not only give rice to Vietnam but its lifeblood when needed?

You have pointed out some of Gilly's fallacious deductions from the Tricontinental Conference. But why, as sober men who do not take Fidel's word on Che's whereabouts, do you not question Gilly's qualifications for statements, apropos widespread concern for Che: "All the Cuban people are asking." You know Gilly hasn't been in Cuba since 1963. How does he maintain this mystical bond with the Cuban people? Through those witnesses to the murder of Che? There is no question that the Cuban people love Che. But who helps main-

*This statement is not true. We never gave the story out as fact; we never believed it to be a fact; and Gilly never told it to us as a fact. Mr. Yglesias is evidently misinformed.—*The Editors*

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tain Che's presence among them, if not the Cuban government's wide distribution of his writings, of posters holding up his example to them? Why don't you or Gilly—who seem to be privy to so much and so aware of contradictions—comment on Che's loving estimate of Fidel in his last published piece, "Socialism and Man in Cuba," or in that last letter saying farewell? Speculating on Che's "liquidation," Gilly said to me, "That letter is a problem—its style is genuinely Che's and would be hard to imitate."

Ah, what problems you boys have set yourselves! Take that popularity contest you've initiated with the statement, "More than anyone else, even more than Fidel himself, Che has come to symbolize all that is best, all that is pure, all that is beloved in the Cuban Revolution." Do you really believe that is so for the Cuban people? And do you believe, given the obvious answer, that this means some lack of feeling for Che? Why don't you answer that from Che's writings—reading matter I recommend to you? I asked Gilly if he thought anyone could hope to appeal to the Cuban people in opposition to Fidel, and he had no reply.

I submit you're no CIA agents or imperialists. You're dullards, that's all.

José Yglesias
New York, April 7, 1966

Negroes in the Wallace Campaign

Anne Braden's otherwise fine account of the Southern Freedom Movement (MR Vol. 17, No. 3) gives scant credit to the Negro participation in the Wallace campaign, which in many ways was the first national political expression of the Negroes in this century. The publication of the second volume of Dr. Curtis MacDougall's very comprehensive account of that campaign (*Gideon's Army*, Marzani & Munsell) makes available the details necessary for any full understanding of the fight for Negro freedom in this country.

When in 1948 Henry Wallace announced his candidacy, he found that Negroes were among his most ardent sup-

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porters. Because of his unequivocal position on segregation, many Negroes were determined to see that he got on the ballot. In fact, it was only because so many Negroes signed the petitions that Wallace did get on the ballot in many states.

The Wallace campaign gave the re-enfranchised Negroes their first chance to assert themselves politically. Although no one thought Wallace could win on a third-party ticket, the chance to stand for a program that would continue the New Deal appealed to many Negroes who saw the federal administration retreating. In supporting Wallace, the Negroes could feel at least that they were not called upon to compromise their just claims. Their support for Wallace frightened the two older parties and caused them to make gestures they had never made before. Since Wallace's campaign, no candidate for President has been willing to speak before a segregated audience.

Wallace included Negroes in every aspect of his campaign. They not only helped put him on the ballot but they also participated in the work of every state committee. A greater percentage of Negro than white voters voted for Wallace in November. George Murphy, writing in the *Crisis* in August 1948, estimated that there were 45 Negroes running for high office on the Progressive Party ticket, "the largest number of Negro candidates ever picked to run on a single ticket since the days of Thaddeus Stevens."

In Little Rock, Arkansas, the editor of the Little Rock *Gazette*, Harry S. Ashmore, in the interest of free speech, interviewed Wallace on the radio. There as elsewhere, Wallace's tone was unequivocal. He said: "It is not only desirable to break down segregation; it is absolutely necessary. We must meet the issue head on."

Throughout the country the Young Progressives of the Wallace campaign were challenging Jim Crow in very much the same manner which became widespread six years later. Senator Glen Taylor, Wallace's running mate for the Vice Presidency, was jailed in Birmingham for refusing to observe the Jim Crow regulations of that city.

In Baltimore the Young Progressives campaigned against the discrimination of the Baltimore Park Board's segregation

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rule and picketed both the Democratic and Republican conventions in Philadelphia, soliciting funds to defray the court costs of a test of the rule forbidding mixed tennis on the public courts. A mixed group defied the ruling and disregarded the order of the Chief of Police to disperse. When police were called to arrest them, the players lay down on the courts and had to be carried to the patrol wagon. Similar demonstrations by Young Progressives were held in other places.

The experience of the Wallace campaign made many Negroes realize that political action was not only possible but necessary. They proceeded to carry on their political efforts despite Senator McCarthy, the House Un-American Committee, and Senator Eastland's Sub-committee on Internal Security. They were ready to take advantage of the Supreme Court's reversal, in 1954, of its 1896 position, holding that segregation in the public schools did violate the Constitution.

Clark Foreman
New York, April 1966

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

One by One?

United States bombing of North Vietnam began in February 1965. On April 13, 1966, the *New York Times* announced the "regular B-52 bombing of North Vietnam." Fourteen months of casual bombing having failed to bring the North to its knees, Washington proposed to "give them the works."

North Vietnam is one of Asia's socialist countries.

Capitalist countries, led by the United States, are committed to a policy of "containing" and finally of destroying socialism-communism.

Socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union and People's China, are committed to defend, extend, and strengthen socialism.

In this cold war struggle, North Vietnam is a spectacular test case.

After the Geneva Conference divided Vietnam temporarily at the 17th parallel and gave the North Vietnamese a chance at self-determination, the 15 million people who live north of the 17th parallel had a dozen years in which to clear up war damage, make plans, reorganize their economy, and begin the momentous task of building socialism in a remote corner of Southeast Asia.

It goes without saying that socialism-communism in North Vietnam is in a very early stage of its development. At the same time it is evident that the North Vietnamese have made notable headway against heavy odds.

It is likewise evident that North Vietnam is one of the most exposed and vulnerable segments of the rapidly expanding socialist-communist movement in Asia. It is geographically farthest south of the Asian socialist governments. Overland communications with People's China are difficult; with the Soviet Union they are tortuous.

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Under cover of its anti-communist policy in Asia, the United States has taken these successive steps:

- *Building up* United States diplomatic and military presence in South Vietnam and adjacent parts of Southeast Asia.
- *Designating* North Vietnam, a sovereign nation for the past twelve years, as the mainstay of the Viet Cong-led rebellion against the government of South Vietnam.
- *Over-flying* and photographing the sovereign territory of North Vietnam.
- *Bombing* North Vietnam bridges and other means of communication.
- *Gradually extending* the bombing of North Vietnam to power stations, oil storage tanks, closer and closer to the capital city of Hanoi.
- *Bombing* north of Hanoi, closer and closer to the Chinese frontier.
- *Rapidly building up* military installations in South Vietnam.
- *Constructing* airfields, harbor facilities, and other capital installations in South Vietnam.
- *Raising* troop personnel in one year from 20,000 to more than 250,000.
- *Watching and weighing* the probable consequences of the expanding United States economic and military build-up in Southeast Asia.

What conclusions may, with reason, be drawn from this sequence of events?

(1) Washington is testing the possibilities of holding the line against socialist-communist expansion in Asia and restoring Western empires to their former position of Asian mastery.

(2) In pursuit of this policy, Washington is ready and willing to destroy life and property in a small socialist country and to carry on this policy month after month, for years.

(3) The big socialist country on the scene, China, will tolerate such attacks on a socialist neighbor and respond only with diplomatic warnings and the dispatch of engineers and work crews to help clear away rubble and restore normal function.

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(4) The largest and oldest socialist country, the Soviet Union, will issue warnings against the aggressors, while supplying the North Vietnamese with defensive weapons: anti-aircraft guns, planes, ammunition.

(5) Leftward-leaning elected governments in non-socialist countries, tolerant of socialism, such as Brazil and Indonesia, can be overthrown by local military coups backed and supervised by Washington.

(6) Other and smaller socialist countries will express indignation, extend and provide first aid, but will take no decisive action to oppose or stop the armed attack against a sister socialist republic.

(7) The dozen existing socialist countries have no known policy and no generally accepted mode of procedure when the anti-communists launch an attack on one of their number, nor do they have any political or military apparatus for dealing with such an attack.

Does this experience mean that NATO, SEATO, or the government of the United States can proceed, cautiously, tentatively, and gradually, to pick off the smaller and weaker socialist countries one by one, using armed force to achieve this objective, without serious danger of joint action by the socialist nations, by their liberal-socialist sympathizers, or by the two major socialist powers?

SOS from the Far North

Little Iceland, with a population of 190,000 (that of Grand Rapids, Michigan, is 202,379; of Albuquerque, New Mexico, 201,189) sends an urgent call for help against a foreign invader who is interfering in its domestic affairs and threatening its existence as a nation. The call comes from Sigurd Lindal, Secretary of Iceland's Supreme Court:

> The most troublesome issue today in Icelandic cultural life is bound up with the fact that a great foreign power has pushed its way into Icelandic society with the help of the most powerful propaganda instrument ever invented. I refer to the American television station in our country which has brought a more mischievous influence into our national life than we have ever experienced before. . . .

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We must find ourselves by serving some purpose as we carry on the struggle for existence here at the top of the world. We must cultivate love of country, exercise our own independent attitudes toward life, renew our pride in original creative work.

A foreign military television station is not suited for encouraging the growing generation to maintain a cultural community here. It is not suited for kindling the patriotism that is the chief factor in moving us to serve our society. . . . This television enterprise strikes at the foundations of Iceland as a nation. . . .

I do not know what the United States' purpose is in this matter, and I am not familiar with the methods of the psychologists who direct their propaganda activities. To be sure, the Americans have declared that they have no intention of using television to gain influence over Icelandic life. But the history of the television problem is so roiled and muddy that we cannot believe their protestations. In reality, we are faced here with most impudent meddling in domestic affairs and with unbelievably provocative behavior. (*Atlas*, April 11, 1966, pp. 241-242, quoting from the Reykjavik newspaper *Morgunbladid*.)

Rumania Grows Up

Rumania was a pre-industrial country at war's end in 1945. During the course of the war it suffered heavy damage. The country was largely agricultural, importing manufactured goods and paying for them by exporting food products and raw materials. Rumanian economic and political policies were decided in Western Europe.

Rumania today is building socialism, economically, politically and socially, with seven principles in view: (1) building socialism as a preliminary to the establishment of communism; (2) planning its present and future public life in all fields; (3) maintaining relations with any and all countries that will grant reciprocity; (4) converting Rumanian raw materials, insofar as possible, into finished products inside Rumania; (5) making the output of its enterprises competitive, in quality and price, with the best on the world market; (6) constantly raising the cultural level of the Rumanian people; (7) providing Rumanian youth with the inspiration and the skills needed to carry out this program.

Implementing these policies has depended on the industrialization of the Rumanian economy and active participation in foreign trade. Results in these directions are impressive:

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	Index of Industrial Production	Index of Foreign Trade
1950	100	100
1955	202	100
1960	340	299
1964	573	476

The Chamber of Commerce of the Socialist Republic of Rumania publishes the facts in a handsomely printed quarterly: *Rumanian Foreign Trade,* 22 N. Balcescu Boulevard, Bucharest.

Bulgaria Also Develops

Bulgaria, another Southeast European country chiefly agricultural before 1945, has developed industries and expanded its exports of manufactures. Bulgarian foreign trade agencies in 1966 will show their products at eleven international fairs and some fifty specialized and independent exhibitions, including the twenty-second Plovdiv Fair.

Bulgarian engineering products in 1965 accounted for 24.5 percent of the country's total exports. Among these engineering exports were various types of lathes, thread-cutting machines, milling machines, hydraulic presses, burnishing machines, and various types of farm machinery. Bulgarian engineering exports, in 1965, went to 65 countries, among them the Soviet Union, Britain, France, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Canada, and Japan.

A Capitalist Country Goes Socialist

Two years ago I paid a visit to the German Democratic Republic. Critics of socialism have said that socialism could take root only in underdeveloped countries. Achievements in the German Democratic Republic provide an effective answer to such criticisms. Starting its life amid war ruins, the country has proceeded to construct an effective planned economy and a socialist society.

During my brief stay in the German Democratic Republic this February (1966), I met and mingled with comfortably dressed men, women, and children; visited well-stocked shops, stores, and supermarkets; saw clean, well-managed schools; visited efficient production units; attended superb theater productions, concerts, and public meetings.

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My visit in 1966 confirms the opinion which I formed in 1964, that the German Democratic Republic is on its way to becoming an outstanding example of the conversion of highly developed capitalism into workable socialism.

Incident in Berkeley

Berkeley, California, has been described as the liveliest and most exciting city in today's United States. One reason for such distinction was offered in a letter which reached me in late April.

"This Berkeley peace movement is a very real thing, and its leaders have done a thorough educational job. Although it may have been in your papers, I'll mention only one indication of just how thorough it's been. U.N. Ambassador Goldberg was in Berkeley a few weeks ago for Charter Day at the University of California. He was to be awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws degree. Despite tremendous campus opposition, the university administration went ahead with the award. There were picketings of Goldberg when he arrived, and a veritable sea of picket signs greeted him in the Greek Theatre when he received the degree. Huge numbers of students, and some professors, walked out at the moment of the degree-granting.

"A few hours later, Goldberg spoke at U.C.'s big Harmon Gym under the auspices of the Faculty Peace Committee. It was a sort of informal debate on the war. At the chairman's request, Goldberg was received courteously and with almost perfect silence throughout the meeting. At the close, however, the chairman asked for an expression of sentiment from the audience (roughly 7,000 people—students, faculty, and some townspeople). Those in favor of the administration's Vietnam policy were asked to stand. A bare sprinkle of people stood up. (Estimates of how many vary from 50 to 200, but it looked to us to be closer to 50.) Then he asked those who opposed the administration on Vietnam to stand. Virtually the entire audience rose silently to its feet—some 7,000 people. It was a stunning moment, as I suspect that no one realized until that moment just how great was Berkeley's opposition to the war. A real thrill. We don't experience many such victories in today's America."

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BOOKS

MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

BY PETER LATHROP

MR plans to publish a full-length review of *Monopoly Capital* in due course. In the meantime it seems appropriate to reprint what is, we believe, the first review to be published anywhere, not only for its high quality but also because of its source—*The Stanford Daily* (March 30), the student newspaper at Stanford University where Paul Baran was a professor of economics from 1949 until his death in 1964. Peter Lathrop did his graduate work at Stanford, partly under Paul Baran.—*The Editors*

Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order by Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1966, $8.75.

Postwar American social criticism bears more than a passing resemblance to postwar toothpastes. Based on detailed, "neutral" scientific research, both commodities are brightly packaged, endlessly multiplied, constantly advertised, and available at the nearest supermarket. Both sweeten the user's breath, but neither cures decay.

By a specious, incessant repetition and description of symptoms we paradoxically conceal the structural causes of social diseases. Real social problems are inundated by volumes of that genre of criticism "which knows how to judge and condemn the present, but not how to comprehend it" (Marx).

And as pleasant but ineffective "cures" become addictive, we require larger doses of Vance Packard or Jessica Mitford to produce a catharsis of indignation.

Thus, a self-confessional social criticism which permits individual withdrawal under a smoke-screen of "confrontation" and "engagement" generates its own illness—an increasing inability to produce or, for that matter, to recognize a genuine critique of the social whole.

If *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy is buried in this dreary context of hastily written and soon forgotten pseudo-criticism, it will be a national rather than an international misfortune. For outside the United States the authors are considered leading Marxist

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economists and social critics of this century.

Baran is known primarily for his important work on the economics of underdevelopment, *The Political Economy of Growth* (1956), and Sweezy for *The Theory of Capitalist Development* (1942), still the best exposition of Marxian economic theory in English.

Their long awaited book will be carefully studied by revolutionaries and students in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, as well as by intellectuals in England and Europe—in short, by those who need to understand the domestic character of American monopoly capitalism in order to combat its global imperialist manifestations.

And however obscured by a national cultural apparatus which systematically distorts theoretical reflections of its irrationality, their work should also receive careful attention locally, for until his death in 1964, Paul Baran was Professor of Economics at Stanford.

A brilliant teacher, he was admired by students and despised by a timid administration financially dependent on the corporate rich, on the managers of the irrational social order which Baran brilliantly and remorselessly dissected.

Monopoly Capital is the distillation of decades of critical thought and analysis, a written record available to Stanford students who missed the rare opportunity of knowing Paul Baran.

Written over a ten year period in close collaboration with Paul Sweezy, the book is an "essay sketch," a preliminary overview of the contemporary American socio-economic structure.

It "derives its essential unity from one central theme: the generation and absorption of the social surplus (i.e., the difference between what a society produces and the costs of production) under conditions of monopoly capitalism."

In Chapters 1-3, Baran and Sweezy analyze the large corporation, the primary generator of surplus and hence the main locus of economic and political power. They argue that "owing to the nature of price and cost policies of the giant corporations, there is a strong and systematic tendency for the surplus to rise."

Chapters 4-7 focus on the chief possibilities of absorbing the surplus: consumption, investment, and waste. Consumption and investment, they demonstrate, cannot provide sufficient escape valves for a constantly expanding surplus. Therefore, "since surplus which cannot be absorbed will not be produced, it follows that the *normal* state of the monopoly capitalist economy is stagnation."

To counteract depressive tendencies, monopoly capitalism seeks other outlets for its surplus—in the "sales effort," in an unwieldy civilian government, and in militarism and imperialism. Since these wasteful and destructive outlets are crucial to

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the survival of the entire social order—and hence to the preservation of its hierarchy of wealth, power, and prestige—they become institutionalized and vigorously defended by the system's apologists.

Irrationality is thus shown to be *generated* by a contradictory economic structure and *expressed* in the quality of individual and social life which the authors survey in the closing chapters of the book.

In terms of their theory of monopoly capitalism, Baran and Sweezy *explain* the chief social maladies which most social critics merely *describe*. Thus, the enormously debilitating human effects of advertising and frantic consumption are traced to the sales effort, a necessary weapon in the fight aginst stagnation.

Similarly, the anti-communist crusade which has dominated and infected the American mentality, justifying witch hunts at home and brutal wars of intervention abroad, is shown to be a consequence of the most "rational" solution to the thorny problem of surplus absorption—a giant military establishment.

By exposing the basic mechanisms of monopoly capitalism, Baran and Sweezy illuminate the limits of the system and the futility of efforts to reform it.

The reader may reject their prescription of socialism, of planned production to satisfy human need, but he should first study the theory of monopoly capitalism. Closely reasoned and skillfully documented, *Monopoly Capital* is probably the most important postwar critique of American society as a whole.

The authors have not tried to impose an ill-fitting nineteenth century model of competitive capitalism on contemporary conditions. Instead, they have used Marx's methodology as a tool for analyzing the present as history.

Their model therefore, cannot be dismissed with simplistic anti-Marxist clichés; it must be discussed, revised, refined, or refuted in terms of contemporary social reality.

SLAVERY AND CAPITALISM

BY DOUGLAS F. DOWD

The Political Economy of Slavery, by Eugene D. Genovese, Pantheon Books, 1965, $6.95.

The principal virtue of this book is that it systematically takes up and firmly settles what may be called the twigs and branches of a part of the American system, the part that made up the nature, functioning, and immediate implications of Amer-

Douglas Dowd is a Professor of Economics at Cornell University.

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ican Negro slavery. I have no important quarrel with, and much reason to admire, Genovese's careful and heavily supported arguments on the economics and politics of slavery. His procedure is essentially one of synthesis of earlier works and contemporary opinion, put together in an appropriately broad interpretation guided by Marxian political economy. However, what I have called the twigs and branches, Genovese paints as a tree, with slaveholding as the roots and the trunk. And it is here that I find the principal defect of the book.

As it was for W. J. Cash, for Genovese the South was "another land." I too have viewed it thus, as everyone can and must, but only for certain purposes. If, for example, one is attempting to understand why economic development took on the particular pace and direction it did in the antebellum and postbellum South, the South's separateness must be noted —tentatively. But little of the South can be understood unless it is understood, also, that from beginning to end, the South was and is, always, part of this country—economically, politically, socially, culturally. "Part of this country" is not used as an expression either of sentiment or geography. The South is American most especially, and most importantly, b e c a u s e of the power it holds in America, and the American power to which it is subject. That was true before, during, and after the Civil War, and it is true today. Just how the balance of power would tip was the prime issue of the Civil War, as the author surely knows. Slavery was not the issue to *both* sides; power was. By seeming to write of the South *qua* South, rather than as part of America, Genovese has done very much better what others have done; I fear that like others he too has let slip the meaning of the South, and of slavery, to the United States, then and now.

Most Americans would like to think of the South as the skeleton in our closet, a closet sitting in a handsome house, a closet that one day will be made clean. But that particular skeleton has always been alive and muscled, and its muscles have been used throughout the house; m o r e important, Southerners have been among our principal architectural consultants, before and since 1860. The house of industrial capitalism has many rooms, with many vistas.

This is not to deny what constitutes the principal theme of this book: "the slave South developed neither a strange form of capitalism nor an undefinable agrarianism but a special civilization built on the relationship of master to slave. . . ." (p. 35.) Nor is it to argue against what Genovese characterizes as the ideology arising from and maintaining the master-slave relationship, the ideology of the slaveholding planters:

"T h e planters commanded

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Southern politics and set the tone of social life. Theirs was an aristocratic, anti-bourgeois spirit with values and mores emphasizing family and status, a strong code of honor, and aspirations to luxury, ease, and accomplishment. In the planter's community, paternalism provided the standard of human relationships, and politics and statecraft were the duties and responsibilities of gentlemen. The gentlemen lived for politics, not, like the bourgeois politician, off politics." (p. 28.)

Still, the question of the South in America persists, and answering it necessarily entails an effort to account for disparate elements in the career of American capitalism. Southern mores have not been the only disparate element in the development of our society; nor has there been a major capitalist power without its own disparate — and crucial—elements. Thus, to call to mind only the most obvious example, the role of "anti-bourgeois" forces in the rise of German capitalism—if militarism and overheated nationalism are in that category—cannot be set aside if the pace, the direction, the strength, and the quality of German economic history are to be even vaguely comprehended. Those German qualities are neither less nor more anti-bourgeois than what we find in the South. Indeed, with only slight alterations in the quotation above, one could read Germany for the South.

But, it may be objected, surely all this is wrong-headed, for Genovese is concerned only with the antebellum South? And the South along with its slaveholding system was destroyed by war? Again, as much or as little as the German Yahoos were destroyed by the First World War. It is indeed most instructive to hold the *post*bellum South in mind while reading Genovese. In that period—that is to say, up to the present—chattel slavery had been abolished, and presumably so too had been the slaveholding system that fed on it. But, as Genovese well knows, all but the forms of chattel slavery endured in the South, to be washed away, to the extent that they have been, by the waves of depression, world war, and industrialization. The one definitive change brought by the Civil War was that the power of the North could no longer be disputed. But that is to say something else of great significance, something that C. Vann Woodward has said better than others. What therefore happened in the South after 1865 has been at the convenience, and with the connivance, of the North, that is, of America—economically, politically, socially, culturally. One need not adopt a conspiratorial viewpoint to believe that the South has served the nation's purposes; nor is the generalization at all shaken by the recognition that the South's own purposes have also been served.

If Professor Genovese finds reason to disagree with much of

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the above, I should be surprised; but he will surely wonder what the relevance of it all might be to what he has done. My answer is that a Marxian historian has, or should have, self-imposed standards that go beyond those of his more conventional colleagues. I write here, if this need be said, as an *amicus curiae,* not as carping critic, and I write with the shortcomings of Marxian historiography in general in mind. That one should be prompted to do so in reviewing this particular book is more a tribute to its strengths than to its weaknesses, for Genovese has revealed himself as one considerably more able and inclined than most to extend himself as the problem demands. In stretching his analysis to its outermost limits (by bringing into meaningful focus not only economic but non-economic matters) he also illuminates for the serious reader what he has failed to do—to place southern political economy as an integral part of American political economy.

The problem for the slaveholders was *not* that slavery could not be tolerated in America; it was that the kind of power over the direction of American affairs required if the slave system was to be able to prosper indefinitely was slipping daily from the hands of the South and into the increasingly strong hands of Northern industrial capital. Genovese knows this, writes of it, and characterizes the onset of this problem as the development of a "general crisis." That "general crisis" was in some respects quite similar to the one faced by the American colonists about a century earlier, a crisis which the times and the technology allowed them to surmount and win. Having done so, cooperation between the British and the Americans resumed—as it did between the North and the South.

If Genovese is trying to show why the South did not industrialize before 1860, he has gone a long way toward success. Similarly, if he aims to set the record straight on the reasons for low productivity among slaves, he has done so. He shows that soil exhaustion, seen frequently as a problem with, so to speak, a life of its own, was not the decisive factor. He convincingly explains the overweening importance of the master-slave relationship in all aspects of Southern life; the great Southern need for geographic expansion; and how the Civil War pretty much couldn't be stopped, unless the South wished to lose without fighting first—clearly not its (or the American?) style. If that's all he wanted to do, then Genovese has done a fine job; but then he has not written fully in the best Marxian tradition.

For Marx, and those appealed to by his spirit and his methods, it is not setting the record straight that counts most—essential though straight records are. It is today and tomorrow that command our attention,

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and we study the past so that we may distil from it a social theory which will enable us to change society for the better, not be its dumb and yielding captive. What I ask then is: what is the *relevance* of this study, having set the record straight? If there are questions of contemporary relevance in the author's mind, they are not revealed to his readers, implicitly or explicitly. Readers of his book will find it easier to win arguments about the causes of the Civil War, and the character of Southern society before 1860; and they will learn something about historical scholarship that deserves admiration. But if, as is like to be true of most readers of MONTHLY REVIEW, they are much horrified, even terrified, by the behavior of America at this time, they will find little in the way of illumination here.

To state it all a little differently: Genovese has written a book that will command the respect of his profession, and one that will be most helpful to many a college student of history. He has written the best book yet on slavery. That is saying a lot. What he has failed to do, for this reviewer, is to do what one of his persuasion and knowledge might have done, namely, to place the antebellum South in America as an integral part of America's past, present, and future. Until that is done, and until we act on what we learn, we shall not overcome the grim meaning of the South in America, or America in the South.

THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH ARE HERE, TOO

BY SLATER KING

The Wretched of the Earth, by Frantz Fanon. Preface by Jean-Paul Sartre. Translated from the French by Constance Farrington. Grove Press, New York, $5.00.

When I first read portions of Frantz Fanon's book, *The Wretched of The Earth*, in the English periodical *Views*, it had a tremendous emotional impact upon me, an impact strengthened when I read the book itself. I was amazed to discover the similarities between the exploitation and dehumanization of the Algerians and the treatment of Negroes in the more rural coun-

Slater King is the leader of the Albany Movement (Albany, Georgia), which was discussed in some detail by Anne Braden in "The Southern Freedom Movement in Perspective," MR, July - August, 1965, pp. 43-46.

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ties of the southern United States.

Fanon speaks, for example, of the native-born Algerian intellectual who, after receiving a Western education in a French university, returns to his native village where a man's obligation, once for himself alone, was now being changed into an obligation toward others. Similarly, when SNCC came into the South to attempt to bring together the small black bourgeoisie and the Negro masses in an effort to overthrow their oppression, I as a so-called intellectual had to enlarge my own concept of my obligation toward my fellows.

The steps in this process of change are described by Fanon thus: "Individualism is the first to disappear. The native intellectual had learned from his masters that the individual ought to express himself fully. The colonialist bourgeoisie had hammered into the native's mind the idea of a society of individuals where each person shuts himself up in his own subjectivity, and whose only wealth is individual thought. Now the native who has the opportunity to return to the people during the struggle for freedom will discover the falseness of this theory."

Negroes in the South have usually been isolated from each other; those who have gotten ahead share the bourgeois attitude of "I've got mine the hard way, now damn it, you get yours" toward the masses who engage in brawling and killing on Saturday nights out of their frustration and anger over a situation about which they can do nothing so long as each man is out for himself. Fanon speaks of such killings in Algeria, saying that after unity was achieved in the fight against the oppressor, these killings ceased. The same thing happened in Albany, Georgia: during the demonstrations there, mayhem and murder among Negroes was reduced to naught because for the first time they had found something meaningful to do in attacking the system that had enslaved them.

Fanon emphasizes that there has been no real revolution in those newly emerging countries where the government has been turned over to the native bourgeoisie without a struggle. He believes that it is violence, or the constant threat of violence, which has dehumanized and kept the native in his place, and that it is only when he uses violence himself to overthrow the oppressor that he forges an identity with his people, thereby ceasing to do violence to his fellows and at the same time recreating a sense of his own manhood.

According to Fanon, "It is clear that in the colonial countries the peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays. For him there is no compromise, no pos-

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sible coming to terms; colonialization and decolonialization are simply a question of relative strength. . . . Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence."

Here in the South the threat of violence has been omnipresent, like the miasma that constantly rises from swamps. I can never forget how my parents' faces filled with fear at the approach of white persons whose threats were sometimes implied, sometimes open. A psychiatrist has told me that at a sanitarium in New England where he treated middle-class or well-to-do Negroes, all of them suffered from the feeling that they were always being watched—a feeling most of us share. For all over the southern United States, the Negro has known that he could be beaten or killed at the whim of a white person, and nothing could be done about it.

I myself do not have the answer, but many of us feel that the United States government, as it is presently structured, can never give freedom to the masses of poor Negroes and poor whites. Fanon's answer is the exhortation: "Natives of all underdeveloping countries, unite!" The overtones of this cry are beginning to seep, I think, into the minds of many of us here in the United States. While problems in each developing country differ, and Fanon offers no cure-all, he does give a guide to all of us who suffer from the same grievances. Though as Negroes we reside in no one geographical area, we are indeed the underdeveloped people of this nation; we have been exploited in the North, the South, the East, and the West. The sole difference is that in the North there is more chicanery and sleight-of-hand, whereas in the South the brutality is stark, exposed, and raw.

Fanon has great scorn for those natives who have been sent to European universities and return as talking parrots, mouthing Western clichés about freedom and democracy. These are the black intermediaries, the persons who form the black bourgeoisie and are the agents for their former European masters. Here in the South, since slavery, the usual appointed agent of the white power structure has been the Negro minister. He has urged the "field niggers" to be obedient and humble in the performance of their tasks. Today, as more Negroes are appointed to better positions, a Negro managerial class is emerging to exhibit the same attitudes that Fanon reports in the newly developed African countries, where some members of the new bourgeoisie speak of the "common Arab" and of the Negro workers with a disdain that equals that of the old colonialists. Further, Fanon says that the new bourgeoisie is interested only in feathering its own nest. Does this not sound

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familiar in connection with the Negroes who are appointed to administrative and executive positions in New York and Washington?

Fanon's greatest scorn, however, is reserved for the bourgeoisie—whether black or white colonialist—which, after a period of inactivity, introduces the new idea of non-violence. In its simplest form, the tactic of non-violence signifies to the economic and intellectual elite of a colonized country that the bourgeoisie has the same interests as they have, and it is therefore urgent and indispensable to come to terms for the public good. Non-violence is an attempt to settle the colonial problem around a green baize table, before any blood is shed. But if the masses, without waiting for the chairs to be arranged around the baize table, listen to their own voices and begin to commit outrages and to set fire to buildings, the elite and the nationalist bourgeois parties rush to their colonialist masters to exclaim, "This is very serious! We do not know how it will end; we must find a solution—some sort of compromise." Does this not raise echoes of events in Harlem in the summer of 1964 and in Watts a year later? Does anyone think that the masses of Negroes actually believe in non-violence? It is worthy of note that many Negroes and progressive whites have come to agree that Negroes must protect themselves. In fact, Bob Moses of SNCC has said, "We don't waste our time talking to the farmers about non-violence in Mississippi because all of them believe in defending themselves, and they are not interested in non-violence."

To me, Fanon's most important precept is to develop a sense of obligation toward one's fellows by sharing experiences and joining with them in the struggle for a richer and fuller life. It is Fanon's hope that the societies in the newly developing area—and it is the hope for our South too—will not choose merely to imitate the old colonialist culture, but instead will end man's alienation from himself and from others by working together for a greater destiny than has been known before.

If we are automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement, making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries who wish to preserve the status quo.

—Senator J. W. Fulbright,
September 16, 1965

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A RADICAL SPEAKS

BY STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN

The Conscience of a Radical by Scott Nearing, Social Science Institute, Harborside, Maine, 1965. 191 pp. $3 cloth; $1 paper.

The Conscience of a Radical was written, according to its author, for the purpose of "helping those born since 1945, who, by expectancy tables, should be alive in 2020 A.D." Dr. Scott Nearing, now in his eighties, has provided them and the rest of us with an exciting, streamlined primer on being a radical in a promising yet threatened world. His preface opens with these words: "My conscience is aroused, outraged and anguished by the dangerous drift of mankind toward self-destruction, by the Satanic role which the United States is playing in the fateful drama. I must speak out."

Dr. Nearing is a born teacher; his material is organized with precision and uncluttered with extraneous detours. His respect for man's past social achievements will give heart to those who are depressed by the world's condition.

Chapter II, "Change Is the Order of the Day," dramatizes the extraordinary speed-up of social and technological change in recent years and sets the stage for his major thesis that man is capable of managing his new environment if he educates himself for what is required for survival and real progress. He illustrates his thesis with a reference to the past 1,000 years of Western man.

For Dr. Nearing there is evidence that provides reasonable confidence that man can reshape his future: "The extensive utilization of the materials and resources of energy which lie ready at hand in nature's storehouse; second, the discovery that inventiveness is not the product of inherited genius, limited to a privileged few, but is one of the most widely distributed of human faculties; and three, the rapid extension, accumulation and distribution of scientific and technical information. Release of millions of people from compulsory bread labor has played an important part."

The author's treatment of counter-revolution is fresh, provocative, and creative. He includes what he calls its "circus" aspects: the efforts to distract the population from the building of a good and rational society by means of the "perversion of the mass media with blandishments, scandal, horror,

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Stephen H. Fritchman is the minister of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles.

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doctored news, admonitions, warnings and threats." Dr. Nearing deals sharply with the efforts of the counter-revolution to "buy off the people by flooding the mass market with a dazzling, bewildering, engrossing supply of goods and services."

He concludes that "history is with the radicals. Timid liberals, stubborn conservatives find it increasingly difficult to hold the line against the gigantic forces that are sweeping mankind."

Scott Nearing has always practiced the precepts he advocates, often to the profound confusion and annoyance of neighbors, employers, and public officials. You may take issue with some of his dicta regarding diet, zoos, pets, and alcohol, but you will have to meet his logic with a better logic of your own, and this won't be easy. He is a happy agitator, a healthy and delightful reformer, an uncorrupted radical. As I read the last page of this book I was reminded of Frederick Douglass's dictum: "If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will."

READ

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Review from *New World Review*, January 1966

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(*continued from inside front cover*)

Adolfo Gilly, the controversial reporter who has written frequently for MR in the past two years, has been arrested and is now in jail in Mexico for the alleged crime of plotting to overthrow the Mexican government and establish a communist regime. His co-prisoners are five Mexicans and two Argentinians, all charged with being Trotskyists of one sort or another. The whole case is a blatant frame-up which our informants in Mexico say is at bottom an attempt to smear the massive and remarkably effective strike of students at the National University of Mexico. All of the prisoners were brutally tortured for three days in an only partly successful attempt to extract damaging confessions. In Gilly's case, the threat was made to turn him over to the Azurdia dictatorship in Guatemala which would not hesitate to wreak the most terrible vengeance for his past reporting on the Guatemalan guerrilla movement. To avoid this fate, Gilly "confessed" to having attended one meeting of a Trotskyite group in Mexico. On arraignment before the judge, he and his fellow-accused emphatically repudiated the statements which had been extracted from them under duress. They are now in prison awaiting trial, which under Mexican legal procedure may be delayed for months or even years. If convicted, they face the possibility of long prison terms. Whatever one may think of Gilly's political position as evidenced in his recent writings, especially his article on the Tricontinental Conference which appeared in the April issue of MR, no principled socialist, or even liberal, can help being outraged by this monstrous persecution of a few individuals who have obviously been selected as scapegoats precisely because of their weakness and lack of significant political support. We strongly urge all MR readers to protest this gross caricature of justice. Write to the Mexican Embassy in Washington and/or to the presiding judge of the court which has jurisdiction over the case: Sr. Eduardo Ferrer McGregor, Juez Primero de Distrito en Materia Penal, Bucareli 24, Mexico, D.F.

We record with sadness the recent death from lung cancer of our friend Warren Miller who until his last illness was literary editor of the *Nation*. He was a talented writer and a warm and charming personality who will be greatly missed by his many friends and admirers.

By the time this issue of MR reaches its readers, we will have moved from 333 Sixth Avenue to a new address at 116 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011. The move was motivated, and indeed made inevitable, by the continued expansion of the publishing activities of MR Press. In our new quarters we have more office and storage space, and the layout is a great improvement from the point of view of both attractiveness and efficiency.

Speaking of changes in address, let us renew once again our plea to subscribers that if you move you should notify us at once, including both the old and the new addresses. And if you are going to be away on vacation in July and want your magazine to follow you, be sure to send us your vacation address. The next issue will, as usual, be a double July-August issue, and it will be delivered early in July. After that the next issue will be in September. It follows that if you are planning to be away only during August and through Labor Day in September, there is no need to let us know your vacation address.

PLEASE NOTE

MR's new address: 116 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011

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MR PRESS

Monthly Review Press proudly announces the forthcoming publication of

FANSHEN

A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village

by William Hinton

Dear Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman:

. . . I think it important that you know something of the history of the manuscript [of FANSHEN]. The conditions under which I gathered the material are made clear in the text, but the real story began afterwards. I carried the notes on my back over much of North China, dove with them into slit trenches to escape bombing, and marched with them at night to avoid encirclement by Fu Tso-yi's cavalry.

When I finally brought them home from China they were confiscated by the U.S. Customs. Three years of legal maneuvering pried them out of Customs only to have them seized by the Eastland Committee. The notes then became the central exhibit at three days of public hearings. In the end, in spite of promises to the contrary, the Committee impounded them. A lawsuit against Senator Eastland and all his colleagues lasted another two years and swallowed up $6000.

It was 1958 before I finally won possession of my notes [gathered in 1948] and was able to begin to write. By that time I had no resources. I borrowed money, worked overtime to save money, took part-time jobs and finally received help from the Rabinowitz Foundation. In the meantime, I was blacklisted; this has made it almost impossible to make a living here [in Philadelphia] and I am currently [February, 1964] working at night in a veritable sweatshop of a trucking outfit.

What all this adds up to is 15 years of effort and sacrifice in order to make this story known. If quality were any function of effort, then the book would of course be a world beater. I do not claim that it is that good, but I do think that it is an important book that will be read by hundreds of thousands in other parts of the world, if not here; and that of course is the reason I have devoted so much time, effort, and struggle to it.

William Hinton

Dear Bill Hinton:

We agree that it is an important book, a very important one, and that it is worth every bit of time, effort, and struggle that went into it. We are sure that MR readers will think so, too.

Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy

Price on publication in the fall: $12.50
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